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1The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, The Third Restatement, and 
the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault1
by Ellen Wertheimer2
Introduction
Strict products liability developed out of a perceived need to 
protect consumers from the costs engendered by defective products.  The 
basic idea was that manufacturers should be liable for the injuries caused 
by their defective products evenBmaybe especially--in the absence of 
manufacturer negligence.  Indeed, if it were sufficient for liability to 
result only for negligent design, failure to warn, or mismanufacture, there 
would have been no need for a new theory of liability, because 
negligence-based liability would have provided adequate consumer 
protection.   It was widely recognized, however, that negligence based
liability was not enough, and that manufacturers should be responsible for 
injuries caused by the products they designed, labeled, marketed, and 
sold, even if their conduct had been reasonable.  The costs of such 
injuries had to fall somewhere, and, as between an innocent plaintiff and 
an innocent manufacturer, the courts chose that the costs fall on the 
manufacturer.  In order to accomplish this, the courts needed a new 
1 AThe Biter Bit@ is the name of an ironic short story by Wilkie Collins.  In this story, 
a young police officer (the Biter of the title), is himself bitten by his wish to show up the old 
guard police force. The analogy here, of course, is that those who would have eradicated 
strict products liability in the Third Restatement may well have caused its rejuvenation, as 
this article discusses.  AThe Biter Bit@ appears in WILKIE COLLINS, TALES OF TERROR AND 
THE SUPERNATURAL, Dover Publications, Inc. (1972), at pages 268-294.
2 Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law.  I want to thank Christine 
Andreoli and Joseph Larkin, my research assistants, and Nazareth Pantoloni, librarian 
extraordinaire, for their help in writing this article.  I am also grateful to Mark Rahdert for 
2theory of liability, one that went beyond negligence.  When the new 
theory was codified in the form of Section 402A of the Second 
Restatement of Torts,3  the courts enthusiastically and almost uniformly 
adopted it as the law of their jurisdictions.4  Under strict products liability 
theory, and under Section 402A, manufacturers would be liable for their 
defective products even if the manufacturers had exercised all due care in 
the design and manufacturing process.
There were three types of defect.  Products could be defective in 
design, defective in having inadequate warnings, or defective because 
his suggestions.
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS ' 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any property in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer...
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a)  the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his productY
4 Berman v. Watergate West, Inc., 391 A.2d 1351, 1356 (D.C. 1978) (ASubsequent to 
the decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., and the promulgation of ' 402A of 
the RESTATEMENT, the concept of strict liability in tort spread rapidly. At the date of this 
writing, the CCH Products Liability Reporter lists 45 states as having adopted the concept. 
One other state and the District of Columbia are cautiously placed on this list with a 
footnote reading >inferred by court decision.=@) (footnotes omitted); Brandenburger v. Toyota 
Motor Sales, U.S.A., 513 P.2d 268, 272 (Mont. 1973) (AThe trend seems to be to adopt the 
theory of strict liability as it has now been adopted by a majority of the states....We adopt 
the definition, as other jurisdictions have, set forth in 2 Restatement of Torts 2d ' 402A...@); 
Turner v. Hudson, 1986 Me. Super. LEXIS 278, 282 (Me. 1986) (AIn almost every other 
jurisdiction, strict liability is common law doctrine.  The highest courts of other states have 
simply Aadopted@  402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.@); Phipps v. General Motors 
Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) (AAlmost all of the courts of our sister states have 
adopted the strict liability principles set forth in ' 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  Several reasons for adopting strict liability are summarized ... We find the above 
reasons persuasive. . . .  Therefore, we adopt the theory of strict liability as expressed in '
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.@); Greeno v. Clark Equip. Co., 237 F.Supp. 427, 
432-33 (N.D.Ind. 1965) (AThe direction of the law is clear.  Again drawing on the language of 
and authorities cited by Judge Wisdom in Putman, we find that >Part of the impetus has 
come from an almost unanimous call from the authorities in the field of torts.=  If the 
Restatement correctly states the conditions of recovery now in practice, let those elements 
have a fresh name...The question is now squarely before this court and must be decided.  It 
is perhaps fortuitous that the Indiana Supreme Court has not yet passed on this issue, but 
doubtlessly that forward-looking court would embrace the Restatement (Second), Torts '
402A, and the many recent cases and authors who have done likewise, as eminently just 
and as the law of Indiana today.@)(internal citations omitted).  
3mismanufactured.  All three types of defect were covered under section 
402A by a single rule of strict liability.  Of the three, the last, 
mismanufactured products, need not detain us here: manufacturers have 
for many decades been liable for mismanufactured products under a 
theory of res ipsa loquitur.5  This basis for liability seamlessly became the 
mismanufacture doctrine of 402A, and has never caused either courts or 
manufacturers any qualms.
Design defects and failure to warn, however, began causing 
problems as soon as Section 402A was adopted.  Courts had never 
imposed liability without fault in such a broad spectrum of cases, 
although liability without fault was not unknown, even in tort cases, 
where res ipsa loquitur had come to function as a form of  liability 
without fault.  That res ipsa was liability without fault is clear from an 
examination of the cases.  In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., for 
example,  the defendant manufacturer could present infinite and 
irrefutable evidence that it had acted as a reasonable manufacturer in the 
bottle-filling and inspection processes, and no one would have been 
interested because the bottle exploded.6  It is more than possible that 
5 Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944) (exploding soda bottle).
6 Escola, 150 P.2d at 439, 440 (AY the evidence appears sufficient to support a 
reasonable inference that the bottle here involved was not damaged by any extrinsic force 
after delivery to the restaurant by Defendant.  It follows, therefore, that the bottle was in 
some matter defective at the time Defendant relinquished control, because sound and 
properly prepared bottles of carbonated liquids do not ordinarily explode when carefully 
handled . . . AUnder the general rules pertaining to the doctrine Y it must appear that 
bottles of carbonated liquid are not ordinarily defective without negligence by the bottling
company. . . .Although it is not clear in this case whether the explosion was caused by an 
excessive charge or a defect in the glass, there is a sufficient showing that neither cause 
would ordinarily have been present if due care had been used.@).  See also, Rizzo v. Corning, 
4Coca-Cola was not, in fact, negligent, but no one cared.7  In fact, the 
plaintiff in Escola admitted that she could not prove negligence on the 
part of the defendant.8
Unlike mismanufacture cases, however, failure to warn and 
design defect cases presented problems for courts accustomed to 
negligence-based liability.  In design and failure to warn cases, courts 
found it difficult to develop standards that would differentiate strict 
liability from negligence, simplify the plaintiff=s burden of proof, yet stop 
short of imposing absolute liability on manufacturers for all product-
related injuries.  Negligence had proven inadequate to provide the level of 
consumer protection that courts felt was necessary in the modern era., and 
plaintiffs= resources were viewed as inadequate to compete with those 
available to manufacturers.  But no one felt that all injuries should be 
compensated.
Two types of defectBin design and warning--are the focus of this 
Inc., 105 F.3d 338, 343 (7th Cir. 1997) (AA carafe designed to be used for years, not months, breaks in 
half without being dropped or banged or cleaned with abrasive cleaners or damaged in a flood or fire.  In 
these unusual circumstances the accident itself is sufficient evidence of a defect to permit, though of 
course not compel, the jury to infer a defect.@); Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 733 (9th Cir. 
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1987) (AUnder Hawaii law, application of res ipsa loquitur raises no 
presumption of negligence. The doctrine merely establishes a prima facie case of negligence; it allows the 
case to go to the jury.@); Higgins v. General Motors Corp., 699 S.W.2d 741, 743 (Ark. 1986) (AStrictly 
speaking, since proof of negligence is not in issue, res ipsa loquitur has no application to strict liability; 
but the inferences which are the core of the doctrine remain, and are no less applicable.@).
7 Escola, 150 P.2d at 440 (AIt is true that defendant presented evidence tending to 
show that it exercised considerable precaution by carefully regulating and checking the 
pressure in the bottles and by making visual inspections for defects in the glass at several 
stages during the bottling process.  It is well settled, however, that when a defendant 
produces evidence to rebut the inference of negligence which arises upon application of the 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to determine 
whether the inference has been dispelled.@).
8 Escola, 150 P.2d at 438 (APlaintiff then rested her case, having announced to the 
court that being unable to show any specific acts of negligence she relied completely on the 
5article.  The thesis of this article is that courts, initially enthusiastic about 
strict products liability, gradually backtracked from their own standards 
for imposing liability until, in many jurisdictions, strict products liability 
ceased to exist.  The Third Restatement of Products Liability, ostensibly 
codifying this incremental process into black-letter law, eliminated any 
strictness from products liability and transformed it back into a 
negligence-based doctrine.  At least some courts, forced to confront the 
Third Restatement=s clear formulations, suddenly remembered why they 
had adopted strict products liability in the first place and returned to that 
doctrine.  The very codification of what had been a incremental process 
forced courts to confront fully the implications of the incremental process 
itself, and they did not like what they saw.
This article first  turns to the definitions of defect, in which the 
seeds of the retreat from strict products liability were planted.  The 
definitions of defect have been discussed on numerous occasions, both in 
cases9 and in the legal literature.10  The focus in this brief discussion will 
be on the three problem points of unknowable dangers, consumer 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.@).
9 See generally Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991); 
Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988); Barker v. Lull Engineering, 573 P.2d 443 
(Cal. 1978); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984); Beshada v. Johns-Manville 
Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 
1974).  
10 See Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to 
Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980); James A. 
Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919 
(1981); Frank J. Vandall, ADesign Defect@ in Products Liability: Rethinking Negligence and 
Strict Liability, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 61 (1982).
6expectation and reasonable alternative designs.  
I.  The Early Days of Defining Defect: Easy Cases Make 
Problematic Law
Once courts decided that strict products liability was a good idea, 
they set about defining its scope.  Everyone agreed that manufacturers 
should  not be liable for all injuries caused by their dangerous products; 
they should only be liable for injuries caused by their defective
products.11  Thus, dangerous products fell into two piles: dangerous and 
defective products, and dangerous and nondefective ones.  Into the latter 
pile would fall reasonably dangerous products like knives, ladders, 
automobiles, and certain prescription pharmaceuticals like vaccines.  Into 
the former pile would fall those unreasonably dangerous products that 
were found to be defective.  
The first step, of course, was to define defect.  Not all dangerous 
products would be defective; strict liability was never intended to be 
absolute.12  Unlike defectiveness, dangerousness is a factual attribute.  
11 Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 
144 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing definitions of defect with regard to the doctrine of strict 
liability in tort, the court states, AWhat is common to all these definitions is the idea that 
"defect" in the strict liability context is not synonymous with ineffectiveness or "ordinary" 
malfunction; the "defect" must be one that is unreasonably unsafe for the intended use of 
the product. It is the safety and dangerousness of the defect that is the essential element of 
the doctrine.@); Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 677 (W. Va. 1979) 
(quoting Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443 in which the court held that strict liability does 
not mean that the manufacturer has become the insurer of its product nor does it result in 
absolute liability.); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Baughn v. 
Honda Motor Co., 727 P.2d 655, 659 (Wash. 1986) (AMost jurisdictions that employ the risk-
utility approach require that there be something wrong with the product before a risk-
utility analysis is permitted.@); McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 171 (2d Cir. 1997) (AIn 
order for strict products liability to apply, there must be a defect, i.e., something wrong with 
the product ...@).
12 Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. 1976) (AThus, the theory of 
7Defectiveness, on the other hand, is a legal one.  The difference between 
dangerous products and defective products resembles the difference 
between factual causation and proximate causation.  Factual causation is, 
as its name suggests, a factual finding that the defendant caused the 
plaintiff=s injury.  Proximate causation represents a legal conclusion that 
the defendant should be liable for the injury, and is a very different matter 
from factual causation.  Causation may be factual without being 
proximate: the defendant may have caused the plaintiff=s injury but not be 
legally responsible for it.13  Similarly, a dangerous product may or may 
not be defective.  All injury-causing  products are dangerous, but 
manufacturers are only liable for defective ones.  Defective products are 
those factually dangerous products for which manufacturers are legally 
responsible.  Dangerousness is a factual attribute: the product caused 
injury.  Defectiveness is a legal conclusion that the manufacturer is 
responsible for the injury.
In need of a way to decide for which dangerous products 
manufacturers would be liable,14   courts set about defining defect, and 
strict liability is not a radical departure from the traditional tort concepts.  Despite the use 
of the term Astrict liability@ the seller is not an insurer, as absolute liability is not imposed 
on the seller for any injury resulting from the use of his product.  Proof of a defect in the 
product at the time it leaves the control of the seller implies fault on the part of the seller 
sufficient to justify imposing liability for injuries caused by the product.@).
13 In the famous case of Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. V. Morts Dock & Engineering 
Co., 1961 A.C. 388 (Privy Council 1961), it was indisputable that the defendant had caused 
the fire by spilling oil on the surface of the water: without the oil, there would have been no 
material for the plaintiff=s workers to ignite.  The defendant was not liable to the plaintiff in 
this case, however, because the oil was not the proximate cause of the damage.
14 The court in Barker v. Lull Engineering, 573 P.2d 443, 446-47 (Cal. 1978),  reflected 
on the necessity for defining defect.
8reached various conclusions as to what should constitute a defective 
product.  The definitions uniformly focused on the product and not on the 
manufacturer=s conduct; the latter focus belongs to negligence, the former 
to strict products liability.  As one court observed:
A negligence action focuses on conduct, specifically 
the quality of the act causing the injury; a strict products 
liability action focuses on the product itself. . . . The rise 
of strict liability in products liability actions results from 
the perception that the manufacturing enterprise can best 
carry the cost of injuries occasioned by defective products 
as an element of product cost.15
As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin succinctly stated, A[s]trict 
products liability focuses not on the defendant=s conduct but on the nature 
of the defendant=s product.@16
But courts still needed to specify what characteristics of a 
dangerous product made it defective.  The major tests for defect that 
emerged from this need included the imputation of knowledge17,  the risk-
utility test,18 and the consumer expectation test.19  Sometimes the courts 
used one of these tests exclusively; sometimes they used them in 
combination.20
15 Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1983).
16 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 745 (Wisc. 2001).
17 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033 (Or. 1974).
18 Sperry-New Holland v. Prestage, 617 So. 2d 248, 254-55 (Miss. 1993), superceded by
Wolf v. Stanley Works, 757 So. 2d 316 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
19 Barker v. Lull Eng=g Co., Inc., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978). 
20 The Supreme Court of Oregon tied together consumer expectation and 
manufacturer reasonableness in Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036-37 (AA product is defective and 
9Under the imputation of knowledge test, a manufacturer would be 
liable for the injuries caused by a product if a reasonable manufacturer, 
irrebutably presumed to know of the product=s danger, would have 
changed the product in some way (design or warning) before selling it.21
Thus, the courts would not ask what a reasonable manufacturer should 
have known about the product, and unknowability of the danger could not 
constitute a defense.  Under this definition of defect, various factors such 
as the utility of the product, the feasibility of altering its design to 
eliminate or reduce the danger without sacrificing its utility, and the level 
of danger would come into play in the course of examining the 
manufacturer=s decision-making process.22  The feasibility of an 
alternative design would be highly relevant as a factor in the decision on 
whether the manufacturer should have changed the design or whether the 
unreasonably dangerous when a reasonable seller would not sell the product if he knew of 
the risks involved or if the risks are greater than a reasonable buyer would expect.@)
21 Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036 (AA dangerously defective article would be one which a 
reasonable person would not put into the stream of commerce if he had knowledge of its 
harmful character.  The test, therefore, is whether the seller would be negligent if he sold 
the article knowing of the risk involved.  Strict liability imposes what amounts to 
constructive knowledge of the condition of the product.@)(internal footnotes omitted).
22 The seven Wade-Keeton factors for evaluating the risks and utility of a product are:  
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product, its utility to the user and to 
the public as a whole; (2) The safety aspects of the product, the likelihood that it 
will cause injury and the probable seriousness of the injury; (3) The availability 
of a substitute product which would meet the same need and not be as unsafe; 
(4) The manufacturer=s ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product 
without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to maintain its 
utility; (5) The user=s ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of 
the product; (6) The user=s anticipated awareness of the danger=s inherent in the 
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the 
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or 
instructions; (7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading 
the loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.  
Morningstar v. Black and Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 681 (W. Va. 1979)
10
product was non-defective as designed and sold.  If a design change were 
feasible, it would make it more likely that the court would find the 
product defective, because a reasonable manufacturer would have 
changed the design before allowing the product out of its control.  As can 
been seen here, this test is quite close to a pure risk/utility test, because a 
reasonable manufacturer performs a risk/utility balancing process in the 
design phase of every product it makes.
Under the risk-utility test, a product would be defective if its risks 
outweighed its utility.  Under this test, knowledge of the danger was also 
not an issue: the product was examined as it was and as it actually 
performed, including its dangers, whether they were known to the 
manufacturer or not.  This test is close to the imputed knowledge test, 
both because a reasonable manufacturer performs a risk/utility analysis 
on its products before selling them, and also because under neither test 
was the court interested in whether the manufacturer had known of the 
danger, this being tantamount to an imputation of knowledge.  As with 
the imputed knowledge test, the feasibility of an alternative design would 
be highly relevant as part of balancing the risks and utility of the product 
in the form in which it was sold.
Under the consumer expectation test, the court would ask whether 
the product was more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would 
expect.  This test, like the other two, effectively imputes knowledge of 
the danger to the manufacturer, because the question is not what the 
.
11
manufacturer should have known about the product, but rather whether 
the product was more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would 
expect.  The consumer expectation test requires an understanding of 
consumer expectations, but Ano understanding about the product itself.@23
Alternative designs are perhaps less relevant here, as the focus is on what 
the consumer expected of the particular product at issue.
The three types of definition applied to all defects, whether of 
design or warning.24  The types of defect were not treated differently 
from each other: either a product was defective, or it was not.  
In practice, the imputed knowledge and consumer expectation 
tests tended to merge into the risk/utility test.  A reasonable manufacturer 
(under the imputed knowledge test) performs a risk/utility test on all its 
products before selling them.  A reasonable consumer expects the product 
that a reasonable manufacturer would sell.25  Many courts simply held 
that the consumer expectation test included the risk/utility test, or 
abandoned the consumer expectation test altogether.26  Whether courts 
23 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc.,  629 N.W. 2d 727, 742 (Wisc. 2001).
24 It is worth noting that a mismanufactured product is defective under all of these 
tests: if a reasonable manufacturer had known of the flaw, that manufacturer would have 
fixed it before selling the product; a flawed product fails any risk/utility test; and a 
reasonable consumer does not, as a matter of law, expect a flawed product unit.  Res ipsa 
loquitur is basically a shortcut to these conclusions.
25 Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1037 (AY because a seller acting reasonably would be selling the 
same product which a reasonable consumer believes he is purchasing.  That is to say, a 
manufacturer who would be negligent in marketing a given product, considering its risks, 
would necessarily be marketing a product which fell below the reasonable expectations of 
consumers who purchase it.@).
26 See discussion infra.
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applied a risk/utility test, one of the other tests, or a combination, 
however,  the results proved to be controversial in design and warning 
cases, particularly in situations where the product involved an 
unknowable danger or could not be made safer by a change in design.
II.  The Epic Battles with Strict Products Liability: Before the 
Third Restatement
A.  The Demise of Liability for Unknowable Dangers in 
Failure to Warn Cases
The original tests for defect did not deal explicitly with the 
problem presented by liability for dangers that were unknowable at the 
time the product was manufactured.27   By the time the issue arose, the 
courts had set up their tests for defective products.  The cases in which 
the tests for defect were adopted did not involve unknowable dangers.  
For example, Phillips v. Kimwood, the lead case expounding the imputed 
knowledge test, involved an industrial sanding machine that embodied the 
risk of regurgitating sheets of plywood back at the person using the 
machine.28  A set of rear-facing teeth, an easy and straightforward design 
change, would have eliminated this danger.  While the court used the case 
as a vehicle for adopting the imputed knowledge test for defect, the 
27 For the purposes of this article, there is no difference among the time of design, 
manufacture, or sale. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Coping with the Time Dimension in Products 
Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919 (1981).  What is important is that the manufacturer did not know 
of the danger before it materialized.
28 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Or. 1974) (AThe pressure 
exerted by the pinch rolls in the top half of the machine was insufficient to counteract the 
pressure which the sanding belts were exerting upon the thin sheet of fiberboard and, as a 
result, the machine regurgitated the piece of fiberboard back at the plaintiff, hitting him in 
13
plaintiff could, in all likelihood, have proved negligence in design had the 
plaintiff needed to do so.29  The danger was clearly knowable, and the 
manufacturer arguably unreasonable for failing to protect against it.  
Similarly,  Barker v. Lull Engineering,30 a lead case adopting a 
combination of consumer expectation and risk/utility tests, involved a 
piece of construction equipment that lacked a roll over protective shield 
that would help the operator of the equipment in the event of an accident.  
As with Phillips, such a design change was both readily available and 
straightforward, and the manufacturer was arguably negligent in 
designing the product.   The plaintiff could have won a negligent design 
case and did not need strict products liability in order to prevail.
Thus, courts were unprepared for the problem that would be 
presented by lawsuits claiming that a product was defective because the 
manufacturer had failed to warn of a danger about which the 
manufacturer could not have known.  As Phillips and Barker
demonstrate, the early Section 402A cases involved eminently knowable 
dangers, and also dangers that could be eliminated or reduced.  The tests 
for defect adopted in these decisions did not differentiate between types 
of defect or knowable or unknowable dangers.  This cannot have been 
the abdomen and causing him the injuries for which he now seeks compensation.@)
29 Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1038-39 (AIt is our opinion that the evidence was sufficient for 
the jury to find that a reasonably prudent manufacturer knowing that the machine would 
be feed manually and having the constructive knowledge of its propensity to regurgitate 
thin sheets when it is set to thick ones, which the courts via strict liability have imposed 
upon it, would have warned Plaintiff=s employer Y and that, in the absence of such a 
warning, the machine was dangerously defective.@)
14
accidental: knowability of the danger was completely irrelevant to the 
policy that mandated recovery for innocent plaintiffs even from innocent 
defendants.  Indeed, strict products liability was designed specifically to 
deal with cases where the manufacturer had not been negligent.  When 
actually confronted with unknowable dangers, however, the courts 
showed a regrettable tendency to back down from the principles and law 
of strict products liability.  AIn recent years, while an occasional court 
still clings to the notion that strict liability for defective design and 
warnings should not depend upon the foreseeability of the risk,  most 
courts squarely confronting the issue have shielded manufacturers from 
liability for harm caused by unforeseeable product risks.@31
The issue that caused the massive retreat32 from strict products 
liability centered around whether manufacturers should be liable for 
injuries caused by dangers that had been unknowable at the time of 
manufacture.  While in theory there are design dangers that could have 
been unknowable at the time of manufacture,33 the cases tended to be 
30 Barker v. Lull Engineering, 573 P.2d 443, 447 (Cal. 1978).
31 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 273, 287 (1998).
32 Professor Frank Vandall thoroughly documented this retreat in his article, 
Constricting Products Liability: Reforms in Theory and Procedure, 48 VILL. L. REV. 843 
(2003); see also Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products 
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183 (1992).
33 It is difficult to imagine a design defect that would have been unknowable in the 
face of expert testing.  In most design cases, the plaintiff could prevail even if required to 
prove negligence, because the failure to uncover the design problem might itself prove 
inadequate product testing. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 439 (Cal. 1944) 
(AIf the explosion resulted from a defective bottle containing a safe pressure, the defendant 
would be liable if it negligently failed to discover such a flaw.  If the defect were visible, an 
inference of negligence would arise from the failure to discover it.  Where defects are 
discoverable, it may be assumed that they will not ordinarily escape detection if a 
15
about failure to warn, and inevitably focused on whether a manufacturer 
should be liable for failing to warn of a danger about which the 
manufacturer could not have known.34  With one notable exception, 
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp.,35 which involved asbestos, most 
of the initial cases dealt with prescription pharmaceuticals.36  In response 
to what was perceived as the unfairness of holding manufacturers liable 
for failing to warn of dangers about which they could not have known, 
courts almost uniformly, and sometimes with unseemly haste,37 backed 
down from all of the tests for defect that they had carefully developed 
over the preceding years, and imposed a knowability requirement.  While 
courts gave various reasons for their actions, such as the need to 
encourage the development of prescription pharmaceuticals and the 
inhibiting effect that strict liability would have on manufacturers of 
reasonable inspection is made, and if such a defect is overlooked an inference arises that a 
proper inspection was not made.@)
34 Clearly, if the danger were knowable, or if the manufacturer failed adequately to 
test the product, the manufacturer would be liable in negligence.
35 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539 (N.J. 1982).
36 Because they involved prescription pharmaceuticals, many of these cases 
extensively discussed comment k of section 402A, which addressed application of products 
liability principles to pharmaceutical products.  See e.g. Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 
470 (Cal. 1988); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89 (Utah, 1991) (upheld a blanket 
exemption for prescription drugs but refused to rely exclusively on the plain language of 
comment k, calling it Astrained.@); Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 922 P.2d 59 (Wash. 1996) 
(holding that comment k extends a blanket exemption to pharmaceutical drug 
manufacturers); Wolfgruber v. Upjohn, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) aff=d, 417 
N.E.2d 1002 (N.Y. 1980) (stating that the scope of the warning is the key factor in a drug 
products liability suit because prescription drugs are >[unavoidably] unsafe products.=); 
Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So. 2d 1301, 1303 (Ala. 1984) (Stating that 
comment k Aprovides for drugs and vaccines an exception to the strict liability defined in 
402A.@).  For further discussion of comment k, see infra.
37 See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 388 (N.J. 1984).  In Feldman, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court, a scant 23 months after deciding Beshada, ruled that imputed 
knowledge would be restricted to Aknowledge at the time the manufacturer distributed the 
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societally necessary drugs, these reasons cannot fully explain the judicial 
haste in retreating nor the breadth of the decisions, which went well 
beyond pharmaceutical cases.38
The process of this declineBalthough more like a routBcan be 
readily documented.39  In Beshada, an asbestos case, the court reacted 
almost with surprise to the suggestion from the defendants that 
unknowability should constitute a defense in a lawsuit based on failure to 
warn of the dangers of asbestos.40  The court pointed out that strict 
products liability differed from negligence based liability precisely 
because it imputed knowledge of the danger to the manufacturer.  If the 
defendant could use lack of knowability as a defense, it would undercut 
the imputation of knowledge and replace it with the negligence standard 
that section 402A was designed to eliminate.  This would render strict 
products liability meaningless. Perhaps unfortunately, the court reflected 
in Beshada that it was not asking manufacturers to do the impossible in 
holding them liable for failing to warn of all dangers about which 
product.@
38 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d. 470 (Cal 1988) (strict products liability not 
applicable to prescription pharmaceuticals because of special concerns related to that 
industry); Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal 1991) (Brown not 
intended only to apply to prescription pharmaceuticals).
39 See Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict Products 
Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183 (1992) (documenting 
abandonment of imputation of unknowable dangers) (hereinafter Empire).
40 Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547 (N.J. 1982) (AIf we 
accepted defendants= argument, we would create a distinction among fact situations that 
defies common sense.@).
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warnings should be given, whether knowable or not.41  It is of course 
impossible to warn of an unknowable danger.  Impossibility is not the 
issue: responsibility for the product, and for the injuries it has caused, 
is.42  The basis for liability is not negligence, under which doctrine a 
manufacturer would only be liable for dangers about which the 
manufacturer should have known, but rather strict liability, under which 
doctrine the basis for liability is whether the product was defective.  
Under strict products liability, liability for a product follows from 
responsibility for that product, and not from negligence in producing it.  
The manufacturer may not have known of the danger, but the 
manufacturer designed, packaged, and sold the product, and should accept 
responsibility for the injuries it causes provided the product fails the 
applicable test for defect.  The manufacturer may not have known of the 
danger, but the plaintiff did not know of it either.43  Under strict products 
liability, as a matter of policy the costs of defective products move to the 
manufacturer, and should not be left on the plaintiff.  A>[P]ublic policy 
demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products. . . be 
placed on those tho market them, and be treated as a cost of production 
41 Id. at 546  (A When the defendants argue that it is unreasonable to impose a duty on 
them to warn of the unknowable, they misconstrue both the purpose and effect of strict 
liability.  By imposing strict liability, we are not requiring defendant to have done 
something that is impossible.@).
42 See Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 716 F.2d 1425, 1434 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1983) (AAs a policy 
matter, strict liability in products cases deals with enterprise responsibility.@).
43 See Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 754-55 (Wis. 2001) 
(manufacturer liable for unknowable danger; consumer did not know of the danger, and the 
consumer expectation test applied).
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against which liability insurance can be obtained.=@44
The fact that Beshada was an asbestos case perhaps made it easier 
for the court to rule in favor of the plaintiffs, because the public interest 
arguments that would later emerge in prescription pharmaceutical cases 
were absent.  Less than two years later, in Feldman v. Lederle Labs., the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey backed down from this doctrinally pure 
position and allowed unknowability as a defense in a case involving a 
prescription pharmaceutical.45  One might argue that Beshada itself was a 
product of the Aeasy cases make problematic law@ proposition, and it is 
clear that the court was much more comfortable holding asbestos 
manufacturers liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers than it 
was holding drug manufacturers liable in the same kind of case.  Be that 
as it may, the court in Feldman seemed horrified at the idea that a 
manufacturer could be liable for failing to warn of an unknowable danger.  
Although the court denied that it was overruling Beshada,46 it is clear that 
Feldman did exactly that, stating that AIf Beshada were were deemed to 
hold generally or in all cases. . . that in a warning context knowledge of 
the unknowable is irrelevant in determining the applicability of strict 
liability, we would not agree.47 This clearly  allowed manufacturers to 
44 Id., quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A comment l.
45 Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984).
46 Id. at 388 (AWe do not overrule Beshada, but restrict Beshada to the circumstances 
giving rise to its holding.@)
47 Id. at 387.
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argue that they should not be liable for failing to warn of an unknowable 
danger.48  As one court pointed out:
 Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2d does not 
require that the plaintiff prove the manufacturer knew or 
should have known that the product was unreasonably 
dangerous.  However, courts have refused to hold 
defendants strictly liable in the absence of such 
knowledge or reason to know.  The New Jersey Supreme 
Court held in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. 
(1982), 90 N.J. 191; 447 A. 2d 539, that a manufacturer 
could be strictly liable for harm caused by a product even 
when it could not have known of the danger at the time of 
manufacture.  This case has not generally been followed.  
Courts instead include foreseeability in their analysis of 
strict liability.49
Instead of pursuing a case-by-case approach to the risk/utility test, 
courts discarded the imputation of knowledge altogether in that one group 
of cases in which the imputation of knowledge would determine the 
result: those cases in which the plaintiff could not prove that the 
manufacturer knew or should have known of the danger, those cases in 
which the danger was unknowable.   As one commentator put it: 
A[D]espite their bold rhetoric, courts are seldom willing to apply the 
imputed knowledge approach in those rare cases where it actually makes 
a difference.  Rather, the tendency is to emphasize that imputed 
knowledge differentiates strict liability from negligence only in those 
cases in which the defendant likely knew or should have known of the 
48 All that was left of strict products liability for failure to warn after Feldman got 
through with it was the placement of the burden of showing unknowability on the 
defendant.  The plaintiff did not have to prove that the manufacturer knew or should have 
known of the danger; rather, the defendant had to prove that the danger was unknowable.
49 Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 n.1 (Ohio, 1990)
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risk even without imputed knowledge.@50
Courts used several techniques in the incremental process of 
eliminating strict liability for unknowable dangers.  The first was simply 
to do so outright, the route taken by the Feldman court.  Another was the 
foot in the door technique.  The Supreme Court of California used this 
technique.  In Brown v. Superior Court,51 the court ruled that 
manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals should not be liable for 
failing to warn of unknowable dangers because of the damage the threat 
of such liability would do to the public interest in the development of new 
prescription drugs.  The opinion was carefully crafted to focus on the 
prescription drug industry.  In Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corp.,52  the court, ignoring the difference between asbestos and 
prescription pharmaceuticals, ruled that asbestos manufacturers should 
not be liable for failing to warn of unknowable dangers on the highly 
dubious ground that Brown did not apply only to prescription 
pharmaceuticals.53   Other courts followed suit.54
50 Richard L. Cupp, Jr., and Danielle Polage, The Rhetoric of Strict Products Liability 
versus Negligence: An Empirical Analysis, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 874, 896 (2002).  
51 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
52 A prescription pharmaceutical might pass a risk/utility test, even without a 
warning.  Asbestos certainly does not.
53 Anderson v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 810 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1991).
54 Other courts have extended protection from liability for unknowable dangers beyond 
the field of prescription drugs.   Ruiz-Guzman v. Amvac Chem. Corp., 7 P.3d 795 (Wash. 
2000) (blanket protection for all medical products, including breast implants, but protection 
will be extended on a case-by-case basis for pesticides); Hufft v. Horowitz, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
377, 381 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (extending Brown to implanted medical devices); Terhune v. 
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Yet another technique involved the fox versus foxhound 
approach.55  This technique involved reliance on comment j to section 
402A, which many courts, quoting an edited version of this comment 
from other opinions in other jurisdictions, misinterpreted to allow liability 
only for failing to warn of unknowable dangers.  In this technique, a court 
would quote comment j to Section 402A in support of the position that 
manufacturers should not be liable for failing to warn of unknowable 
dangers.  As quoted by the courts,56 comment j provides:
A.H.Robins Co., 90 Wn. 2d 9 (Wash. 1978) (extending comment k protection to include the 
Dalkon Shield, an internal contraceptive device.); Transue v. Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911 
(9th Cir. 2003) (breast implants); Brooks v. Meditronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 
1984) (holding that a pace maker can fall under comment k protection.); Rogers v. Miles 
Lab., 116 Wn.2d 195, 197, 204 (extending comment k immunity to all blood and blood 
product cases.); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 N.J.Super. 331, 339-40 (holding that hepatitis-
infected blood should be considered an Aunavoidably unsafe product@ as defined in comment 
k.) aff=d 66 N.J. 448; see Hines v. St. Joseph=s Hosp., 86 N.M. 763, 765 (Although not 
expressly stated, extending comment k protection to blood and, more specifically, blood 
infected with hepatitis.).
55 This label is based on an essay by Stephen Jay Gould called AThe Case of the 
Creeping Fox Terrier Clone,@ in which he discussed the problem presented when sequential 
sources simply quote from the preceding source, errors and all.  The essay deals with an 
error about the size of eohippus that appeared in an early biology text; the error reappears 
through decades of texts because the subsequent authors all quote, in sequence, the error as 
quoted in the preceding text.  Comment j to section 402A has been treated much as the 
evolutionary history of horses was treated in these texts.  See AThe Case of the Creeping 
Fox Terrier Clone,@ pages 155-167 in STEPHEN JAY GOULD, BULLY FOR BRONTOSAURUS:  
REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY, W.W. Norton and Co., New York, 1991.  
56 Numerous courts have quoted comment j in this manner.  These include  Anderson 
v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 799 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1986); Vermeulen v. Armstrong World Indus., 
204 Cal. App. 3d 1192, 1204; Malin v. Union Carbride Corp., 219 N.J. Super. 428, 436; 
Chrysler Corp. v. Batten, 264 Ga. 723, 725  (utilizing quotation marks, the judge in this 
seatbelt failure case quotes comment j in a way so that he eliminates the ellipses and takes 
comment j completely out of the allergy context).  Other courts picked up this version of 
comment j in their own opinions, citing preceding opinions as the source.  This process may 
be traced as one follows an identical version from  Zeigler v. CloWhite Co., 234 Ga. App. 
627, 629 and Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Ford, 218 Ga. App. 248, 274) (stating Asee also 
Restatement (2d) of Torts, ' 402A, Comment j (seller is required to give warning "if he has 
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should 
have knowledge" of the dangerY@)) into subsequent opinions, in which the identical 
quotation appeared.  See  Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 33; Hickman v. 
Thomas C. Thompson Co., 644 F. Supp. 1531, 1537 (D. Colo. 1986) (this case involved the 
inhalation of enamel dust and the quote concerning comment j read AThis argument is 
supported by comment j to ' 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which states, 
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Where, however, the product * * * is one whose 
danger is not generally known, or if known is one which 
the consumer would reasonably not expect to find in the 
product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if 
he has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, 
developed human skill and foresight should have 
knowledge, of the * * * danger.
Unfortunately for the intellectual integrity of this analysis, however, 
this is not what comment j in fact says.57  Comment j, without the careful 
ellipses, provides:
Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to 
which a substantial number of the population are allergic, 
and the ingredient is one whose danger is not generally 
known, or if known is one which the consumer would 
reasonably not expect to find in the product, the seller is 
required to give warning against it, if he has knowledge, 
or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill 
and foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of 
the ingredient and the danger.
The seller is required by comment j to warn against ingredients that 
might provoke allergic reactions; the antecedent of the word Ait@ in the 
fourth line of the above quotation is Aingredient,@ and not Adanger,@ and 
the risk involved is the risk of an allergic reaction, not a general danger 
in applicable part, that "the seller is required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by 
the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, 
of the presence of the ingredient and the danger."); McElhaney v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F. 
Supp. 228, 231 (D.S.D. 1983) (quoting comment j as AIn order to prevent the product from 
being unreasonably dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning . . . 
as to its use . . . . The seller is required to give warning . . . if he has knowledge, or by the 
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge, of 
the presence of . . . the danger.@); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 451) (N.J. 1984); 
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corporation, 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998).  
57 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Mont. 1997) (AFurthermore, the 
Chemical Companies rely on only one part of the third sentence of Comment j which, when 
considered in its entirety, indicated that this sentence is not applicable to the question 
certified to the CourtYThe certified question before us involves an alleged cancer-causing 
ingredient, not one to which the decedent is alleged to have been allergic. Therefore, the 
third sentence of Comment j is not applicable to the certified question.@).
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attached to use of the product58.  I am convinced that the courts simply 
quoted comment j from each other, without reading the actual text of the 
comment.  When one reads the text of the comment, one discovers that 
the comment is about allergic reactions, and not about knowability at all.  
Quite simply, the comment does not support the use to which the courts 
have put it.59
A similar technique may be found in court use of comment k to 
justify exempting pharmaceutical manufacturers from Section 402A.  
Courts happily held that comment k provided for an exemption from 
section 402A for all prescription drugs because such drugs are 
unavoidably dangerous.  Again unfortunately for the intellectual integrity 
of this analysis, comment k does not say this.  Comment k, which is 
almost never quoted in its entirety,  provides:  
There are some products which, in the present state of 
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe 
for their intended and ordinary use.  These are especially 
common in the field of drugs.  An outstanding example is 
the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not 
58 In re: Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 665 F.Supp. 1454, 1458-59 (D. Haw. 1986) 
(ADefendants believe that Hawaii will follow comment j, and that comment j allows the 
defense.  I do not believe that the Court will follow comment j with the result that it 
overrides the consumer expectation test when the defendants could not have known of the 
products defects.... But the largest flaw in defendants= argument is that comment j applies 
to products that cause allergic reactions.  Comment j applies to common products, such as 
strawberries, eggs, and possibly cosmetics, that are otherwise safe yet cause allergic 
reactions.  Obviously no one would consider asbestos, lung cancer, or mesothelioma 
resulting from asbestos exposure an allergic reaction.@).
59 Even when they quote comment j in its entirety, however, some courts persist in 
citing Comment j as proof that the manufacturer is only liable for knowable dangers.  This 
knowability requirement, along with Comment j, was then applied to cases that had 
nothing to do with allergies or even pharmaceuticals.  See Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 
556 N.E. 2d 1177, 1180 (Ohio, 1990) (wood-burning furnace). In Crislip, while discussing 
failure to warn issues, the court cited Comment j as supporting the general proposition that 
a manufacturer can only be held liable for failing to warn if the danger was knowable.  
Although the court includes virtually all of the language of Comment j, it italicizes the 
warning language for emphasis and completely ignores the language regarding allergies. 
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uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging 
consequences when it is injected.  Since the disease itself 
invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing 
and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, 
notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve.  Such a products, properly prepared, 
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not 
defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.  The same is 
true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of 
which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to 
physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.  It is 
also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs 
as to which, because of lack of time and opportunity for 
sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance 
of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but 
such experience as there is justifies the marketing and use 
of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk.  
The seller of such products, again with the qualification 
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper 
warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to 
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences 
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to 
supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable 
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable 
risk.  
This language does not include an exemption from section 402A for 
prescription pharmaceuticals.  Far from it.  Comment k provides no 
immunities at all.  Rather, comment k by its own terms provides that 
manufacturers of prescription pharmaceuticals are not liable for damages 
provided their drug passes a risk/utility test.  The example for the 
comment is the Pasteur vaccine, which is dangerous, but which is not 
defective because the disease it is designed to prevent is always and 
hideously fatal.  The Pasteur vaccine is dangerous, but not unreasonably 
so.  Indeed, Comment k invites the application of the risk/utility test to 
drugs; if the drug passes it, the drug is dangerous but not defective; if not, 
the drug is defective.  It is also worth pointing out that a drug like the 
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Pasteur vaccine would be nondefective even in the absence of any 
warning, because no consumer would reject the vaccine even were there 
warnings on it.60  Comment k recognizes the existence of reasonably 
dangerous products.  In order to be so classified, however, the product 
must pass a risk/utility test.  
Some courts simply ruled that there was no difference between 
failure to warn in negligence and under Section 402A.61  These courts 
simply and explicitly abolished strict liability for failure to warn 
altogether.  Manufacturers would only be liable for failing to warn under 
negligence doctrine.  One court remarked:  AAfter reviewing the 
authorities and comments on the failure to warn question, we believe any 
posited distinction between strict liability and negligence principles is 
illusory.  We fail to see any distinction between negligence and strict 
liability in the analysis of those jurisdictions injecting a knowledge 
60 See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974) (risk of contracting 
polio from vaccine compared with risk of contracting polio without it).
61 Some jurisdictions required that manufacturers prove lack of knowability, while 
others simply divided failure to warn law from strict products liability and put it back into 
negligence.
The following are cases require proof of lack of knowability:  Oglesby v. General 
Motors Corp., 190 F.3d 244 (4th Cir. 1990); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194 
(Ill. 1980); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales and Serv., Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 346 (N.D. 1984); 
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 622 (Minn. 1984); Bragg v. Hi-Ranger, Inc., 319 S.C. 
531, 538-40.
The following cases stand for the concept that the standard in strict liability is a 
negligence standard:  Crislip v. TCH Liquidating Co., 556 N.E.2d 1177, 1183 (Ohio, 1990) 
(AThus, the standard imposed upon the defendant in a strict liability claim grounded upon 
inadequate warnings is the same as that imposed in a negligence claim based upon 
inadequate warning.@); Flaminico v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 476 (7th Cir., 1984); 
Standhardt v. Flitkote Co., 84 N.M. 796, 508 P.2d 1283, 1290-1 (N.M. 1973); Castrignano v. 
E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 782 (R.I. 1988).
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requirement into their strict liability/ failure to warn equation.@62
B. The Consumer Expectation Test
Like the imputed knowledge test, the consumer expectation test 
has nothing to do with manufacturer knowledge of the danger.  The test is 
whether the product behaved as safely (or as unsafely) as a reasonable 
consumer would expect.  
As has often been documented,63 the consumer expectation test 
ran into problems from the beginning.  It is undeniable that the consumer 
expectation test posed problems when it was first used.  There may be no 
ascertainable consumer expectation for a particular product.64  Consumer 
expectation for a product may be too low, as is the case for products with 
obvious dangers.65  Consumer expectation for a product may be too high, 
as might be the case for prescription pharmaceuticals.66
62 Olson v. Prosoco, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa, 1994).  Not all courts abandoned 
the imputation of knowledge in such cases.  Hawaii and Massachusetts, for example,  
continued to impute knowledge irrespective of its knowability. See Johnson v. Raybestos-
Manhattan, 740 P.2d 548 (Haw. 1987).   Massachusetts, which initially adhered to the 
imputation of knowledge, only abandoned its commitment to strict products liability in 
1998, in Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998), after other 
courts were returning to the Second Restatement. 
63 See, e.g., Wertheimer, Empire, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. at 1198. 
64 Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967); See also GMC v. Farnsworth, 
965 P.2d 1209, 1221 n.16 (Alaska 1998) (the Supreme Court of Alaska, discussing the 
possible shortcomings of the consumer expectations test and citing Soule v. GMC, 882 P.2d 
298 (Cal. 1994), stated ASoule did recognize, however, that some products may be so unfamiliar to the 
average consumer that it would be difficult to form any intelligent expectations about how they should 
perform.@)
65 If the consumer expectation test governed, no product with an obvious danger could 
be defective.  Courts uniformly rejected this argument, holding that products with obvious 
dangers, while they passed a consumer expectation test, might still fail a risk/utility test.  
See, e.g., Knitz v. Minster Machine Co., 1987 WL 6486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (punch press).
66 A reasonable consumer might expect a vaccine to be without risks when it cannot be 
so and should not be ruled defective simply because it is dangerous.  Such a product might 
pass a risk/utility test.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts ' 402A cmt. k (1965); see also 
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Many courts dodged this three-tiered problem by abolishing the 
consumer expectation test or by reconstruing it as a risk/utility test.67
Thus, as the Phillips court declared,68 the reasonable consumer would be 
held to expect the product that a reasonable manufacturer would produce, 
or the reasonable consumer would perform a increasingly hypothetical 
risk/utility balancing test on the product, the same test the manufacturer 
would perform.  The pure reasonable consumer test fell into desuetude in 
the same case-by-case process that led to the abolition of liability for 
unknowable dangers.
The shift away from the consumer expectation test was initially 
motivated by the need for a standard that would protect consumers from 
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1974) (AAlthough the living virus in the 
vaccine does not make the vaccine defective, it does make it what the Restatement calls an "unavoidably 
unsafe product", one which cannot be made "safe" no matter how carefully it is manufactured. Such 
products are not necessarily "unreasonably dangerous", for as this Court has long recognized in wrestling 
with product liability questions, many goods possess both utility and danger. . . .Applying this standard 
here, the scales must tip in favor of availability. The evil to be prevented -- poliomyelitis and its 
accompanying paralysis -- is great. Although the danger that vaccines may contract polio is qualitatively 
devastating, it is statistically minuscule. On balance then, marketing the vaccine is justified despite the 
danger.@) (internal citations omitted)
67 Flemister v. GMC, 723 So. 2d 25, 27 (Ala. 1998) (concluding that the appropriate 
standard in a crashworthiness case was a test that, although referred to as a consumer 
expectation test, was a hybrid test including risk-utility factors and the requirement of 
proof of a reasonable alternative design.  The Justices stated that A>[c]onsumer expectation,=
considered in the context of the entire text of the relevant jury instruction, is not the 
exclusive test by which a jury evaluates an alleged design defect. Rather, the term 
>consumer expectation= states only one factor of a standard that acknowledges a consumer's 
reasonable expectations as to the intended purpose of the automobile; applicable law also 
requires proof of the attendant risk and utility of the automobile's design and of any 
available design alternatives, from which proof a jury could reasonably conclude that the 
automobile's design was defective.@); Miele v. Am. Tobacco Co., 770 N.Y.S.2d 386, 10 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2003) (AWhile the dissent herein suggests in New York applies a consumer 
expectations test to design defect causes of action, the Court of Appeals made clear in Denny 
v. Ford Motor Co. (87 N.Y.2d 248, 662 N.E.2d 730, 639 N.Y.S.2d 250), that the 
determination of whether a design defect is actionable requires a balancing of risks and 
utilities of the product, with the consumer=s degree of awareness of the product=s potential 
danger but one factor to consider in that analysis.@).
68 Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (Or. 1974).
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products that passed the consumer expectation test because they were 
obviously dangerous.  This is clear in Barker v. Lull Engineering and in 
many of the ensuing cases: courts perceived a need for a standard of 
defectiveness that would leave room for a design to be defective even if 
the product were no more dangerous than a reasonable consumer would 
expect.69
Numerous California decisions have implicitly 
recognized this fact and have made clear, through varying 
linguistic formulations, that a product may be found 
defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer 
expectations, if through hindsight the jury determines that 
the product's design embodies "excessive preventable 
danger," or, in other words, if the jury finds that the risk 
of danger inherent in the challenged design outweighs the 
benefits of such design.70
 In other cases, consumer expectation tests were either rejected or 
transformed into a risk/utility test in order to allow complex products, as 
to which consumers could have no reasonable expectation, to be ruled 
defective.71  Thus, the necessary refinements in the consumer expectation 
69 Barker v. Lull Eng=g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 454 (Cal. 1978) (AY a product may be found 
defective in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations, if through hindsight 
the jury determines that the product's design embodies "excessive preventable danger," or, 
in other words, if the jury finds that the risk of danger inherent in the challenged design 
outweighs the benefits of such design.@); Collazo-Santiago v. Toyota Motor Corp., 937 F. 
Supp. 134, 137 (D.P.R. 1996) (holding that Puerto Rico would adopt the two-prong Barker 
test which would allow a jury to find a product defective even if the product meets an 
ordinary consumer=s expectations.); Caterpillar Tractor v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 
1979) (Adopting the Barker two-prong test, the Supreme Court of Alaska stated A[i]n view of 
the diversity of product deficiencies which could fall within the notion of defect, we are 
persuaded that the Barker two-prong test provides the most comprehensive guidelines for 
instructing juries, without compromising any of the goals of strict liability.@); Ontai v. 
Straub Clinic & Hosp., 659 P.2d 734 (Haw. 1983) (holding that the Barker test would be 
applied in the jurisdiction of Hawaii).
70 Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 62, 71-72 (1st Cir. 2002).
71 Dart v. WIEBE Mfg., Inc., 709 P.2d 876, 879 (Ariz. 1985) (consumer expectation test 
applies to be applied in cases where the consumer could have formed an expectation. 
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test were made in order to allow liability in a broader group of cases than 
that test, literally applied, would have permitted.72  In cases where 
reasonable consumers could legitimately have no expectations, such as 
cases involving highly complex products, and in cases involving obvious 
dangers, plaintiffs could use a risk/utility test to prove defectiveness.73
All of this led to the consumer expectation test becoming 
increasingly disfavored.  Some courts abandoned it altogether in favor of 
a risk/utility test.74  This, of course, does not in itself eliminate liability 
for unknowable dangers because the risk/utility test, like imputed 
knowledge and consumer expectation, has nothing to do with 
knowability.  Rather, the risk/utility test involves weighing the product as 
it was, and no one=s knowledge of the dangerBwhether plaintiff or 
defendantBis relevant to this process. 
AWhere the consumer expectation test is inappropriate [because the consumer has none], 
the question of defective and unreasonably dangerous condition may be determined by 
applying Wade's risk/benefit factors. . . .@).  But see Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 669
(6th Cir. 2000) (noting that although Ohio statute previously provided for both the risk-
utility test and the consumer expectation test, an amendment to the statute in 1998 
eliminated the consumer expectation test from consideration in products designed after 
January 27, 1997.).
72 That group of cases in which consumer expectations were unrealistically high did 
not play a major role in the changing of the test for defectiveness.  Most of those cases 
involved prescription pharmaceuticals, and courts tended to deal with drug manufacturers 
under warning, not design, law.
73 See Dart, supra.
74 See Habecker v. Clark Equip. Co., 942 F.2d 210, 215 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that fact 
finder can only determine whether design was defective after hearing evidence of what 
designs were feasible at time of manufacture and whether they were in fact safer); 
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885-86 (Alaska 1979) (stating that once 
plaintiff has shown injury was proximately caused by product defendant can avoid liability 
by proving benefits outweighed risk of danger); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 573 P.2d 
443, 457-58 (Cal. 1978) (defining defect through a combination of consumer expectation test 
and risk/utility balancing analysis).
30
C.  Reasonable Alternative Designs
  Section 402A does not require that the plaintiff prove the 
existence of a reasonable alternative design as an element of 
defectiveness.  Many courts were reluctant to rule that a design could be 
defective unless it could be made safer,75 but some courts refused to hold 
that a reasonable alternative design was a sine qua non of design defect 
under Section 402A.76   Some commentators took the position that 
liability in the absence of an alternative feasible design, which they called 
Aproduct category liability,@ was tantamount to liability without defect.77
This characterization is both inflammatory and inaccurate.  Liability in 
the absence of an alternative feasible design is liability without defect 
only if and only if defect is defined as requiring an alternative feasible 
design.  If defect is defined in terms of a risk/utility test, the existence of 
an alternative feasible design may be a factor in weighing the product=s 
usefulness and dangers, but is not a requirement for such a weighing 
75 Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 926 F.2d 1217, 1225 (1st Cir. 1990) (AIt is illogical to 
say that a product is defective . . . when >defect= has historically been measured in reference 
to the availability, or at least the feasibility of safer alternatives. . . . [T]he existence of a 
safer alternative design is a sine que non for the imposition of liability.@), aff=d, 926 F.2d 
1217 (1st Cir. 1990), vacated, 112 S.Ct. 3019 (1992) (for further consideration in light of 
Cipollone), aff=d on reh=g, 981 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1992);  Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 679 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding no alternative feasible design for 
cigarettes), aff=d without op., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988); Kelley v. R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 
1143 (Md. 1985) (holding no alternative feasible design for handgun).
76 Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash. 1986)(the 
availability of a reasonable alternative design is Anot a necessary element of a Plaintiff=s 
burden@ in a design defect action.)
77 These commentators included Professors Henderson and Twerski, who were the 
Reporters for the Third Restatement.  See James A Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, 
Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 
66 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1263 (1991).
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process.78  A product must pass a risk/utility test in order to be 
nondefective; it can pass (or fail) such a test whether there is an 
alternative feasible design or not.  An unavoidably unsafe product can 
still be tested under a risk/utility standard, even with a warning on it.79
Holding such a product nondefective because it is unavoidably unsafe 
makes no sense whatsoever.  Useful, unavoidably unsafe products may 
well be nondefective; useless ones should not be exempt from defective 
status simply because they cannot be made safer.80  Be this as it may, 
however, courts tended to allow themselves to be persuaded that liability 
in the absence of an alternative feasible design was liability without 
defect, even though this meant exempting manufacturers of highly 
dangerous/low utility  products from liability.81
78 Leichtamer v. Am. Motors Corp., 1980 Ohio App. LEXIS 13923, 36 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1980) (citing Anderson, Admr. v. Volks-wagenwerk and Traverse Motors, Inc., Case No. 
31230 which stated "Defendants argue that in order to recover, Plaintiffs should have been 
required to prove there was a safer alternative design; there is no such requirement under Michigan law. 
The existence of, or lack of a safer alternative design, may have been relevant, but it is not dispositive in 
the sense that such proof is necessary to make out a prima facie case or in the sense that the court should 
have decided the issue as a matter of law. The trial court correctly instructed that there may be more than 
one proximate cause and that defendants' conduct need only be a proximate cause in order for plaintiffs to 
recover.@);Timmons v. Ford Motor Co., 982 F. Supp. 1475, 1479 (S.D.Ga. 1997) (although the Georgia 
Supreme Court refers to proof of the existence of an alternative design in design defect cases as the Aheart 
of a design defect analysis,@ alternative designs are only one factor in the analysis.); Pease v. Am. 
Cyanamid, 795 F. Supp. 755, 759 (D.MD. 1992) (proof of an altern ative design is one of seven factors to 
be weighed in the balancing test to determine if a product can be considered unreasonably dangerous); 
Newman v. Ford Motor Co., 975 S.W.2d 147, 152-53 (Mo. 1998) (rejecting the Third Restatement=s 
requirement of a reasonable alternative design.)
79 Some products are unavoidably unsafe, and can be rendered non-defective by the 
addition of a warning.  The mere presence of a warning, however, should not automatically 
mean that the product passes a risk/utility test, particularly where the warning provides 
information that does not render the product safe, but which rather informs the consumer 
about dangers that inhere in the normal use of the product.  See Rogers v. Ingersoll-Rand 
Co., 144 F.3d 841 (D.C. Circuit 1998).
80 Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets In Their Eyes, Product Category Liability And 
Alternative Feasible Designs In The Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429 (1994).
81 See Miller v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 679 F.Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1988), 
aff=d without op., 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (no alternative design for cigarettes); Kelley v. 
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As is the case with unknowable dangers, the idea of a reasonable 
alternative design links up with the consumer expectation test for defect.  
If the consumer expectation test is used, the court simply asks whether 
the product was as safe as a reasonable consumer would expect.  This 
question has nothing to do either with knowability of the danger or with 
the availability of an alternative feasible design: the question is simply 
whether the product was as safe as expected by the consumer.  Thus, 
neither unknowability nor lack of a reasonable alternative design should 
constitute a defense for the manufacturer under the consumer expectation 
test.  It should come as no surprise, then, that the Third Restatement does 
not include a consumer expectation test for defect.82
R.G. Indus., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (no feasiable alternative design for handguns).  For 
more recent cases, see Lederman v. Pacific Indus., 119 F. 3d 551, 555 n.5 (7th Cir. 1997);  
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 981 F.2d 136, 144 (4th Cir. 
1992); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 794 F. Supp. 96, 101 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) aff=d in part and 
rev=d in part 984 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1993); Becker v. Baron Bros., 649 A.2d 613, 619 (N.J. 1994); 
Quintana-Ruiz v. Hyundai Motor Corp., 303 F.3d 63, 71 (1st Cir. 2002). .
But see, Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): The 
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1428 (1994) (AThe centerpiece of 
the proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability is the requirement that the plaintiff present 
evidence of a reasonable alternative design as part of her prima facie case. This requirement is not 
supported by the majority of the jurisdictions that have considered the question.@)
Efforts to foreclose liability in the absence of an alternative feasible design have not been 
restricted to the courts.  Legislatures have enacted statutes defining products liability to exclude liability in 
the absence of such a design.  See Brown v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 506, 520-524 (D. N.J. 
2002) for a discussion of one such statute as applied to cigarettes.  The New Jersey Product Liability Act 
foreclosed liability both in the absence of an alternative feasible design and in the presence of consumer 
expectation of the danger.  Other jurisdictions have adopted statutes to protect manufacturers of guns and 
ammunition, as well as of cigarettes.  See, e.g., Chapter 99B-11 of the North Carolina General Statutes.  
Significantly, this chapter was enacted in 1987, the period when strict products liability was being 
curtailed nationally.  N.G.S.A. section 99B-11 (1987).
82 Mismanufactured products almost by definition fail a consumer expectation test, 
and the Third Restatement has left the law applicable to such products alone.  Res ipsa 
loquitur applies to mismanufactured products, and not to any other type of defect.  This 
leads to the fascinating problem of classifying products as defective by reason of 
mismanufacture or design; as Professor Twerski himself has said, one cannot always tell 
from what type of defect a product suffers.  The implications of the classification are 
potentially vast, however: the plaintiff must prove an alternative feasible design if the claim 
is one of design defect, but need only prove that the product caused the injury and that it 
should not have done so if the claim is one of mismanufacture. See eg  James A. Henderson, Jr. 
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This article now sets the stage for the Third Restatement of 
Products Liability.  First, it turns to the eve of the Third Restatement, and 
analyzes where the legal transmogrifications discussed above had landed 
the law as the Third Restatement drafting process began.
D.  The Eve of the Third Restatement
The decimation of strict products liability was greeted with 
enthusiasm by many scholars, including Professors Henderson and 
Twerski, the Reporters for the Third Restatement, who had been opposed 
to liability without fault from the start.83  Fatefully, these eminent 
scholars were appointed to be the reporters for the Third Restatement of 
Torts, and they enthusiastically embraced what they viewed as a judicial 
trend towards reshaping strict products liability into negligence based 
liability.84
It is worth noting that the courts that abolished the imputation of 
knowledge in cases involving unknowable dangers focused exclusively 
on the perceived unfairness to the defendants of holding them liable for 
failing to do something they could not, by definition, have done.  In their 
& Aaron D. Twerski, Achieving Consensus on Defective Product Design, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 867, 
870 (1998) (A...both legal commentators and the practicing bar muddied the waters by confusing the issue 
of the standard for design defect with other issues that have little or nothing directly to do with the 
standard, such as the issue of whether the producer should be liable when a design con forms with the best 
technology available at the time of sale.@)
83 For an extensive listing off all of the articles written by Henderson and Twerski see 
Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles= Heel, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1265, 1265  n. 3 (1994). 
84 Not everyone agreed that there was any such trend.  John Vargo presented strong 
evidence arguing to the contrary in his monumental article.  John F. Vargo. The Emperor=s 
New Clothes: The American Law Institute Adorns A ANew Cloth@ for Section 402A Products 
Liability Design DefectsBA Survey of the States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 493 (1996).  If this article is correct, it convicts the reporters of the Third Restatement 
of overstating the strength of the precedents on which they allegedly relied.
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zeal to protect manufacturing endeavors, the courts ignored or glossed 
over the unfairness to the plaintiffs in leaving them with costs they could 
not, also by definition, have avoided.85  Strict products liability stands for 
the idea that the party that designed, sold, marketed and profited from the
product should pay for the injuries it causes as a cost of doing business.86
However unfair it may appear to hold a manufacturer liable for failing to 
warn of an unknowable danger, it is surely even more unfair to leave the 
costs of the injury on the plaintiff.  Indeed, allowing manufacturers to 
escape liability imposes a subsidy of their manufacturing efforts on 
whatever entity gets left with the costs.  This result is indefensible both 
morally and economically.  The Third Restatement, by codifying this 
subsidy, also brought judicial attention to bear on it. As the following 
analysis will demonstrate, those proponents of eliminating strict products 
liability would probably have been better off leaving their views 
uncodified.
As has been discussed above, the basis for the fairly wholesale 
retreat from imposing liability for unknowable dangers lay in the idea that 
liability for failing to warn of unknowable dangers would be absolute.  If 
the test is a reasonable manufacturer knowing of the danger, defenses are 
85 One of the original policy reasons driving the imposition of strict liability was that it 
Ainsure[d] that the costs of injuries resulting from defective products are borne by the 
manufacturers that put such products on the market rather than by the injured persons 
who are powerless to protect themselves.@ Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 
897, 901 (Ca.l 1963). 
86 MARK. C. RAHDERT, COVERING ACCIDENT COSTS: INSURANCE, LIABILITY, AND TORT 
REFORM 73-74 (1995).
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few and far between, because what fact finder would conclude that a 
reasonable manufacturer, knowing of the danger, would fail to warn about 
it?  The courts could see no defenses that would protect the manufacturer 
from liability in such a scenario, and thus began the retreat from strict 
products liability.
The New Jersey Supreme Court=s highly disingenuous opinion in 
Feldman exemplifies the cowardice of the courts when confronted with 
the fruition of their adoption of strict products liability.  In design cases, 
the manufacturer can argue with at least a chance of success that the 
product, even with its dangers, passes a risk/utility test.  This is the case 
when a product has a high utility and cannot be made safe.  The idea that 
there are reasonably dangerous products comes as a corollary to the idea 
that some products are unreasonably dangerous.  Any product that is 
dangerous, but whose utility outweighs its dangers, is nondefective.  Such 
products include knives, automobiles (with available safety technology), 
and ladders (ditto).  A product whose dangers cause it to fail a risk/utility 
test, like a sander without teeth, is defective.  
The problem in warning cases is that the risk/utility calculus is 
different than in design cases.  A challenged design may pass a risk/utility 
test because its design cannot be altered in such a way as to reduce or 
eliminate the danger.  Warnings, however, are both inexpensive and easy 
to include with or on a product, at least in theory.  A product with a 
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warning will inevitably be safer than a product without one,87 and it 
seems easy, at least with hindsight, to conclude that the product should 
have contained a warning.   Courts, egged on by defendants, concluded 
that factfinders would reason as follows:
1.  The product was dangerous, even though the manufacturer did 
not know of the danger.
2.  Knowledge of the danger is imputed to the manufacturer.
3.  Any reasonable person knowing of the danger would have put 
a warning of the danger onto the product.
4   There was no warning on the product.
5.  Therefore, the product was defective and the manufacturer is 
liable.
Thus, courts decided that imputing knowledge of the danger to the 
manufacturer was inappropriate, because the imputation would lead 
automatically to liability in failure to warn cases.
In design defect cases, manufacturers can defend themselves by 
arguing that the danger (knowledge of which is imputed) was not curable, 
at least not without destroying the product or rendering it useless or 
prohibitively expensive, and thus that there is no feasible alternative 
design.   The product may pass a risk/utility test in the absence of an 
ability to eliminate or reduce the dangers, meaning that the product, 
87 At the very least, a warning will inform the consumer about dangers in the product, 
and, if these dangers are unavoidable, permit an informed choice as to use of that product.
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although dangerous, was reasonably so, and therefore was not defective.88
This is the state of the art defense in design cases.  No truly analogous 
defense is immediately apparent in warning cases: there is nothing 
uninventable about a warning, and it is almost always possible to convey 
one.  The Feldman court viewed unknowability in warning cases as 
analogous to the lack of ability to make a safer product in design cases, 
concluding that unknowability should be a defense in failure to warn 
cases.89  Courts were all too eager to adopt in warning cases what 
superficially appeared to be an analogous defense to the absence of a 
feasible alternative design in design cases: the state of the art defense in 
its warning cases guise,  pursuant to which the defendant would be 
allowed to argue that it was not feasible to warn of the danger because the 
danger was unknowable.  The Feldman court reached this result, as did 
many others.  This, of course, eliminated the aspect that set strict 
products liability apart from negligence based liability in the first place.
The courts who leaped to this analogyBthat feasible alternative 
design is to design defect as knowability of danger defense is to failure to 
warn casesBmissed the point of strict products liability completely.  Not 
only did this result leave plaintiffs paying for injuries caused by
manufacturers, it also created an analogy that does not work.  Courts 
88 This is not the same as requiring an alternative feasible design for the product.  The 
product is still tested under a risk/utility standard, but it must pass or fail that test as it is, 
in the absence of an alternative feasible design.
89 This is what the court must have meant when it said Asimilarly, as to warning 
cases.@ Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 479 A. 2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984).
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forgot the most important part of strict products liability: the risk/utility 
test.  A dangerous product is not necessarily defective: it is only defective 
if it fails a risk/utility test.  Many of the products that courts ruled 
defective in the absence of warnings might not have been ruled defective 
at all, because their utility might well have outweighed their dangers, 
even without a warning.  The dangerous aspect of the product must also 
have caused injury, another aspect of strict products liability neglected by 
the courts, at least in this context.  If the presence of a warning on a 
product would not have affected the use to which the consumer put that 
product, then it is not defective for failure to warn.  
An analogous group of cases appears in the realm of informed 
consent.  The question in informed consent is: would a reasonable patient, 
knowing of the undisclosed risk, have elected the procedure anyway?  
The answer to this question is often Ayes.@  A set of such cases deals with  
polio vaccine and informed consent.  The plaintiff sues when he or she 
develops polio after being vaccinated or after being exposed to someone 
who was.  The risk of developing polio from the vaccine was not 
disclosed to the patient.  Would a reasonable person, knowing of the risk, 
have undergone the vaccination anyway?  It is perfectly possible that the 
answer to this is yes, and may even be Ayes@ as a matter of law. 90  In fact, 
many informed consent cases founder on precisely this causation shoal.91
90 Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F. 2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974).
91 See Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, 408 N.W.2d 355 (Iowa 1987), in 
which the court ruled that informing the patient about a remote risk of death would not 
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Analogously, a court can decide that a product is not defective as a matter 
of law, if there is a risk that a jury will impose liability for a reasonably 
dangerous product.92
This set of cases generates two arguments in strict products 
liability cases.  The first is the argument that the product, even without a 
warning, was not defective.  Of course, having a warning would have 
been better, but its absence might not make the product defective because 
the product, even without a warning, might be of such high utility that the 
failure to warn pales into insignificance.  The second is the argument that 
the plaintiff=s decision to use the product did not depend on the warning.  
Even if the plaintiff had been warned, he or she would have used the 
product anyway.   The absence of the warning does not make the product 
defective unless the product without the warning fails a risk/utility test 
and unless the absence of the warning affected the plaintiff=s decision 
about using the product in the first place.  
The irony of the demise of strict products liability, then, is that all 
this retreating was so unnecessary.  It centered around a fundamental 
mistake, an idea that defendants and many scholars were able to sell to 
the courts.  This idea was that holding manufacturers strictly liable for 
failing to warn of unknowable dangers was tantamount to absolute 
liability and liability without defect.  Manufacturers persuaded the courts 
have affected her decision on whether to undergo the procedure.  Thus, the failure to inform 
the patient of the risk was not causally linked to her death.
92 See Jordan v. K-Mart, 611 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (sled is dangerous but 
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that liability for unknowable dangers would irretrievably damage them 
and have an unfair impact upon them.  It is, after all, impossible to warn 
of a danger about which one could not have known. 
Thus, the courts were frightened into believing that liability for 
unknowable dangers was absolute liability, liability without defect.  They 
were encouraged in this belief by legions of articles, many authored by 
extremely distinguished law professors, many of whom  had, from the 
start, opposed liability without fault,93 and who successfully persuaded 
the courts that liability for unknowable dangers was absolute, and unfair, 
liability.  The syllogism worked like this:
1.  Strict products liability had never been intended to impose 
absolute liability.
2.  Liability for unknowable dangers was liability without defect, 
and therefore absolute.
3.  Strict products liability should not impose liability for 
unknowable dangers.
Thus, the vast majority of courts, when confronted by the issue, ruled 
that manufacturers could not be liable for unknowable dangers.  This 
process was perhaps assisted by the fact that the opinions in which the 
not defective).
93 See, e.g., James A Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in 
Product Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, N.Y.U. L. REV. 265 (1990);  James A 
Henderson, Jr., and Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: 
The Rejection of Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L.REV. 1263; John W. Wade, On the 
Effect in Products Liability of Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
734 (1983); John L. Diamond, Eliminating the ADefect@ in Design Strict Products Liability 
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529 (1983).   For a more complete listing off all of the articles 
written by Henderson and Twerski see n. 3 from Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles= Heel, 61 TENN. 
L. REV. 1265).
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original tests for defect had been developed all involved products with 
eminently knowable dangers.  Thus, the courts could use lack of 
knowability as a means of distinguishing the case before them from their 
prior cases under Section 402A.
The flaw in this analysis is that liability for failing to warn 
requires that the product be defective in order for the manufacturer to be 
held liable, an aspect ignored by those who argue that liability for failing 
to warn of unknowable dangers is absolute.  Liability for unknowable 
dangers is liability without defect, if and only if defect is defined as 
including foreseeable (knowable) dangers.   The original tests for defect, 
of course, included no such requirement.  All of the tests  required that 
the product have a defect, defined in what came to be viewed as 
risk/utility terms.  In other words, a product is defective if it fails a 
risk/utility test, no matter who knew what, when, about the product.  A 
manufacturer will not be liable for dangerous products, only for defective 
ones.  Liability is only absolute if the manufacturer is held liable for all 
injuries caused by a dangerous product; it is not absolute if the 
manufacturer is held liable only for all injuries caused by a defective 
product.  
Confusion between the concepts of dangerousness and 
defectiveness fed the terror of absolute liability.94  But whether the 
94 See Ellen Wertheimer, The Smoke Gets in their Eyes: Product Category Liability 
and Alternative Feasible Designs in the Third Restatement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1429,  1441 
(1994) (AY >[D]angerousness= represents a factual characteristic of a product, while 
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danger was knowable or not, no manufacturer should be liable unless that 
danger made the product defectiveBunless the product failed a risk/utility 
test.  Many of the products at issue in the cases in which the courts 
retreated from strict products liabilityBprescription 
pharmaceuticalsBprobably were not defective at all, because they would 
have passed a risk/utility test with or without a warning.  But the courts 
were muddled about the difference between dangerous and defective 
products, and never performed any kind of risk/utility test on these 
products, preferring instead to dismiss the cases involved on the ground 
that manufacturers could not be found liable for failing to warn of  
unknowable dangers.  It is perhaps worth reiterating that no court in the 
process of the retreat pointed out that the danger had been unknown to the 
consumer as well, and that their refusal to impose liability left the costs 
on the consumer.  Refusing to hold manufacturers liable does not make 
the costs go away; it simply imposes them on someone else.  
Emphasizing the need for an uninhibited pharmaceutical industry allowed 
courts to sacrifice individual plaintiffs for the greater good, without 
analyzing whether liability was appropriate in the first place.95  In many 
cases, the drug would probably have passed a risk/utility test, perhaps as 
a matter of law; alternatively, the plaintiff might have been unable to 
>defectiveness= is a legal conclusion about that product.@); Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable 
Dangers and the Death of Strict Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 1183, 1187 (concluding defectiveness liability is about responsibility rather than 
blame). 
95 There was also no empirical evidence that pharmaceutical companies were in fact 
inhibited by strict products liability.
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show that the presence of a warning would have had an impact on the 
plaintiff=s conduct.
Thus, in order to avoid imposing liability for dangerous, but non-
defective products, courts, encouraged by various academics and 
economic recessions,96 discarded strict products liability altogether.  As I 
have said in earlier articles, adding the requirement that the danger be 
foreseeable basically eliminates liability without negligence: if the danger 
were foreseeable, the manufacturer who fails adequately to perform a 
risk/utility test on the product was negligent in its design and/or 
marketing.  In other words, under this theory of foreseeability a product is 
defective when the manufacturer has acted unreasonably in the face of a 
known danger.  This is negligence, not strict products liability.
It also follows that if, as many courts state,  imputing knowledge 
of the danger is the hallmark of strict products liability,  reinstating the 
requirement that the danger be foreseeable eliminates the imputation of 
knowledge in all cases in which the imputation is result determinative.  
This includes all cases where the danger was unknowable at the time of 
manufacturer.  Under this approach, plaintiffs will lose all cases 
involving unknowable dangers.  They can win all others under a 
negligence theory, and the availability of a strict liability theory will not 
determine the result. 
II.  The Third Restatement and the Response
96 See RAHDERT, supra, at 159-61.
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The Third Restatement codified the abolition of the imputation of 
knowledge by defining defects in terms of foreseeable risks.97  This, of 
course, does away with liability for unknowable dangers in all 
circumstances.  The Third Restatement also established a risk/utility test 
as the sole criterion for defect, eliminating any consumer expectation test 
from the definition of defect, and it added the requirement that the 
plaintiff prove a reasonable alternative design as a Acenterpiece.@98   As 
Professor Owen observed:
The requirements of Aforeseeability@ and 
Areasonableness@ in subsections 2(b) and 2(c) effectively 
reconvert the products liability standard for these types of 
cases to one of negligenceBa rather remarkable retreat 
from section 402A=s explicitly Astrict@ standard of liability 
of the Second Restatement that most courts boldly 
purported to apply to design and warnings cases for thirty 
years.  Thus, . . . subsections 2(b) and 2(c) of the Third 
Restatement abandon the strict liability concept and 
employ negligence principles in design and warnings 
cases.99
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS ' 2 (1998).  This section provides, in relevant part:
Categories of Product Defect
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of 
inadequate instruction or warnings. A product:
* * *
(b) is defective in design when the foreseeable risks of the harm posed by the 
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a reasonable 
alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design 
renders the product not reasonably safe; 
(c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or warnings when the 
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or 
avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and 
the omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably 
safe.
98 Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 2(b): 
The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1428 (1994).
99 David Owen, Products Liability Law Restated, 49 S.C. L. REV. 273, 285 (1998).
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The use of the word Apurported@ by Professor Owen is particularly 
relevant, given that courts had whittled away at the imputation of 
knowledge and the consumer expectation test over the years.  The Third 
Restatement, however, made it impossible for courts to ignore what they 
had done.  
The Third Restatement forced courts to confront what had previously 
been an incremental process of curtailing strict products liability, and 
many courts did not like what they saw.100
In one of the supreme ironies of modern tort jurisprudence, many 
courts upon meeting the Third Restatement took a step back from what 
they had cavalierly done in the past in abolishing the imputation of 
knowledge of unknowable risks, and realized that there was no necessity 
to rule out liability for such dangers. As this portion of this article will 
show,  many decisions rejecting the Third Restatement and reinstating 
strict products liability might not have existed had there been no Third 
Restatement.  It was in confronting the fact that manufacturers were 
avoiding having to pay for injuries they had caused that the courts 
realized the implications of requiring that dangers be foreseeable, of 
eliminating the consumer expectation element and of demanding a 
reasonable alternative design in order for liability to result.  Courts seem 
100 Some courts, of course, followed the Third Restatement, even in the face of their 
own prior precedent that would have required its rejection.  See Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909 (Mass. 1998) (rejecting earlier Massachusetts law to 
follow Third Restatement).
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to have rediscovered that letting manufacturers off the hook does not 
make the costs go away.  It simply leaves them on the plaintiff, and 
perhaps on the public, instead of placing them on the party that caused 
them.  The manufacturer may not have been at fault.  The plaintiff was 
not at fault either.  The Third Restatement sent courts back to the roots of 
strict products liability, to the idea that, as between two faultless entities, 
the party who caused the injury, who designed the product, who sold it, 
who profited from its availability, should pay for the injuries it caused.  
This would not have happened if the opponents of strict products liability 
had not pushed too far too fast. 
There are three respects relevant to this article in which the Third 
Restatement tried to transform strict products liability into negligence 
based liability.  These are unknowable dangers, consumer expectation, 
and reasonable alternative design.  The first, liability for unknowable 
dangers, was eliminated by requiring foreseeability of danger as an 
element of defect.  The second, consumer expectation, was obliterated by 
the adoption of an exclusive risk/utility test for defect.  The third, liability 
in the absence of a reasonable alternative design, was eliminated by the 
requirement that the plaintiff prove that the product could have been 
made safer.  
This article now turns to these three subjects and their treatment 
under the Third Restatement and court opinions dealing with the Third 
Restatement.
A.  Unknowable Dangers
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The Third Restatement requires that dangers be Aforeseeable@ in 
both design and warning contexts before the product can be found 
defective.  By including foreseeability in the definition of defect, the 
Third Restatement foreclosed any liability for unknowable dangers in 
either the design or warning context.  The pronouncement that strict 
products liability for unknowable dangers is dead may have been 
premature, however.  Judging from many of the opinions that have been 
handed down since the Third Restatement appeared on the scene, the 
Third Restatement seems to have constituted some sort of a wake up call, 
although not the call its Reporters intended.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, in refusing to exempt 
manufacturers from liability for unknowable dangers, implicitly rejected 
the Third Restatement=s call for just such an exemption.  The court in 
Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., pointed out that A[f]oreseeability of 
harm is an element of negligence.. . . In other words, strict products 
liability imposes liability without regard to negligence and its attendant 
factors of duty of care and foreseeability [of danger].@101  Nor does 
liability for unknowable dangers constitute absolute liability: the plaintiff 
must prove the product defective as well as dangerous.102
It is perfectly correct to argue that the products liability goal of 
enhancing product safety is not particularly well served (if at all) by 
101 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 745-46 (Wisc. 2001).  The use 
by the plaintiff must be foreseeable, but the danger need not be.  Id. at 747.
102 Green, 629 N.W. 2d at 746.
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imposing liability for unknowable dangers.  But the conclusion that this 
lack of congruence justifies eliminating liability for unknowable dangers 
altogether only follows if enhancing product safety is the only, or even 
the most important, goal of imposing liability in the first place.  The 
Green court rejected this contention:
[the argument that product safety is not encouraged by 
liability for unknowable dangers] focuses on one public 
policy underlying strict products liability w hile ignoring 
a second, more important policy consideration.  Although 
products liability law is intended in part to make products 
safer for consumers, the primary Arationale underlying the 
imposition of strict liability on manufacturers and sellers 
is that the risk of the loss associated with the use of 
defective products should be borne by those who have 
created the risk and who have reaped the profit by placing 
a defective product in the stream of commerce.@103
The court in Green refused to allow a knowability defense, adhering 
instead to a pure consumer expectation test which does not involve 
examination of what the manufacturer knew and when the manufacturer 
knew it.
The Green opinion is particularly noteworthy for its detailed 
analysis and rejection of the defendant=s contention that Wisconsin law 
prior to Green had evolved into a standard that required that the danger 
be foreseeable in order for the manufacturer to be liable for injuries 
caused by that danger.  The defendant, with some justice,  argued that 
earlier opinions had settled Wisconsin law as establishing that strict 
103 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 750, quoting Kemp v. Miller, 154 Wis. 2d 538, 556 (Wis. 1990).             
.
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product liability would not apply in cases where Aa manufacturer does not 
and cannot foresee the risk of harm presented by its product.@104  The 
court painstakingly analyzed away the earlier opinions cited by the 
defendant in reaching its conclusion that Wisconsin law did not embody a  
knowability requirement.105  The court then refused to adopt the Third 
Restatement as a change what it viewed as its law, saying that the Third 
Restatement not only failed to serve Athe policies underlying strict 
products liability law,@  but that it also added both the requirement that 
the plaintiff prove negligence and a reasonable alternative design to the 
burden on the consumer.  The court refused to Aimpose such a burden on 
injured persons.@106
The Supreme Court of  Montana also refused to adopt a 
knowability requirement in Sternhagen v. Dow Co.107  The court adhered 
to its imputed knowledge test, stating that A[u]nder the imputation of 
knowledge doctrine, which is based on strict liability=s focus on the 
product and not the manufacturer=s conduct, knowledge of a product=s 
undiscovered or undiscoverable dangers shall be imputed to the 
manufacturer.  Our adoption of the imputation of knowledge doctrine 
[brings with it a] concomitant rejection of the state-of-the-art defense.@108
104 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 745.
105 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 745-751.
106 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 751-52.   
107 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139 (Mont. 1997).
108 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1143 (Mont. 1997).
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Sternhagen and Green differ from Beshada in one important 
respect.  Like Beshada, they impose liability for unknowable dangers.  
Like Beshada, they are true to their original formulations of the 
appropriate tests for defect, the imputation of knowledge test and the 
consumer expectation test respectively.  But they differ from Beshada in 
one important respect:  timing.  They come at the end of the process of 
dismantling strict products liability, and not at the beginning, and 
represent a return to the first principles behind that doctrine.  The 
Beshada court, writing at the beginning of strict products liability, simply 
followed its own definition of defect in imputing knowledge to the 
manufacturer, refusing to create an exception for unknowable dangers.  
Sternhagen and Green, on the other hand, have come at the end, and were 
written after an exception for unknowable dangers had been created. They 
postdate the Third Restatement, and are all the stronger for confronting 
the arguments that led to the development of the Third Restatement and 
then rejecting them.  Sternhagen and Green should prove of greater 
durability than Beshada, if only because they answer the years of 
backtracking and come back to the beginning again: given a choice 
between leaving the costs of a defective product on an innocent consumer 
and placing them on the manufacturer, the choice is clear.  The 
manufacturer should pay.
B.  Consumer Expectation Test
The Third Restatement eliminated any consumer expectation tests 
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from its concept of products liability, adopting an exclusive risk/utility 
test instead.109  This cleverly removed another means by which 
manufacturers might be liable for unknowable dangers, because such 
knowability is irrelevant to what the consumer might or might not have 
expected from the product at issue.110  Removing the consumer from the 
products liability equation is highly significant and symbolic of the 
orientation of the Third Restatement towards protecting manufacturers.111
As has been discussed above, courts that fled from liability for 
unknowable dangers focused exclusively on the impact of such liability 
on the manufacturers of the products at issue, and never on the impact of 
non-liability on the injured consumer.  It seems appropriate that the Third 
Restatement, which eliminated any liability for unknowable dangers, 
would, like the courts that went before it, remove the consumer from the 
determination of defectiveness altogether.
Confronted by this newly imposed consumer invisibility, and 
feeling a renewed need to respond to it, courts and some legislatures have 
rejected this removal of the consumer from the equation.  Faced with this 
109 Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., Inc., 784 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 2001)(stating that 
section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts requires proof of a reasonable alternative 
design in design cases, and pointing out that, under New Hampshire law, proof of a 
reasonable alternative design is only one possible factor to be considered under a risk-utility 
analysis.)
110 Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 742 (Wisc. 2001).
111 One commentator has pointed out that various sources characterize section 2(b) of 
the Restatement (Third) as “a wish list from manufacturing America.”  Douglas A. Kysar, 
The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700-1726-27 (2003) (quoting Green v. 
Smith & Nephew, Inc., 629 N.W.2d at 751 n. 16 (Wisc. 2001) (quoting Frank J. Vandall, 
Constructing a Roof before the Foundation is Prepared:  The Restatement (Third) of Torts:  
Products Liability section 2(b) Design Defect, 30 MICH. J.L. REFORM  261, 261-65 (1997))).
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removal, the court in Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP. Inc., not only 
reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer expectation test, but also 
reaffirmed its commitment to the consumer expectation test as the sole
test of defectiveness, even in cases involving open and obvious dangers 
and complex products, two areas where the consumer expectation had 
proved problematic to courts in other cases.  When the danger is open and 
obvious, the Green court pointed out, the product will pass a consumer 
expectation test, but suit may be brought for Anegligence, breach of 
implied warranty, or breach of express warranty.@112  Complexity of the 
product was simply irrelevant, in the court=s view, because the issue was 
whether Athe product falls below . . . minimum consumer expectations,@
and not the Ascientific understanding of the product itself . . . .This court 
frequently has upheld use of the consumer-contemplation test in cases 
involving complex products.@113  In vigorously reaffirming its 
commitment to the consumer expectation test, the Green court renewed 
its dedication to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and 
firmly rejected the Third Restatement=s formulations.
The Supreme Court of Kansas agreed, and in Delaney v. Deere & 
Co., renewed its commitment to the consumer expectation test by 
rejecting both an exclusive risk/utility approach and the requirement of a 
reasonable alternative design:
112 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 743.
113 Green, 629 N.W.2d at 742.
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[W]e agree that as the foreword to the Third 
Restatement makes clear, the new Restatement Agoes 
beyond the law.@  Hazard, Foreword to Restatement 
(Third) of Torts, xv, xvi (1997).  Rather than simply 
taking a photograph of the law of the field, the Third 
Restatement goes beyond this to create a framework for
products liability.  We have examined Comment 1 and 
find it wanting.  The adoption of Comment 1 necessarily 
involves the adoption of the reasonable alternative design 
standard and an exclusive risk/utility analysis of that 
reasonable alternative design to determine whether the 
subject product is defective.  This is contrary to the law in 
Kansas.  To summarize the law in Kansas, whether a 
design defect in a products exists is determined using the 
consumer expectations test.114
Other courts have come to the same conclusion as the Supreme Court 
of Kansas.  As was the case in Delaney, a number of courts have rejected 
the Third Restatement=s reliance on a risk/utility test and its requirement 
of a reasonable alternative design because these tests rejected  the 
consumer expectation standard altogether.  As the court stated in  Potter 
v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., in the course of rejecting the Third 
Restatement: AThe defendants propose that it is time for this court to 
abandon the consumer expectation standard and adopt the requirement 
that the plaintiff must prove the existence of a reasonable alternative 
design in order to prevail on a design defect claim.  We decline to accept 
the defendants= invitation.@115   Unlike the court in Green, however, the 
114 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan. 2000).
115 Potter v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1331 (Conn. 1997).  See also, 
Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 728 P.2d 585, 586 (Wash 1986) (holding that the 
availability of an reasonable alternative design is Anot a necessary element of a Plaintiff=s 
burden@ in a defective design action.); Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945 (Kan 2000) 
(The Kansas Supreme Court Justices stated AHowever, Kansas has consistently held that 
evidence of a reasonable alternative design may but is not required to be introduced in a 
design defect action.  Kansas has not used the concept of reasonable alternative design to 
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Potter court did not view consumer expectation as the sole test of 
defectiveness:
Although today we adopt a modified formulation of 
the consumer expectation test, we emphasize that we do 
not require a plaintiff to present evidence relating to the 
product's risks and utility in every case. . . . [T]he 
ordinary consumer expectation test is appropriate when 
the everyday experience of the particular product's users 
permits the inference that the product did not meet 
minimum safety expectations.  Conversely, the jury 
should engage in the risk-utility balancing required by our 
modified consumer expectation test when the particular 
facts do not reasonably permit the inference that the 
product did not meet the safety expectations of the 
ordinary consumer.116
Refusing to adopt section 6(c) of the Third Restatement, and 
salvaging consumer expectation as an important part of products liability, 
another  court remarked:
Next, defendant asks us to adopt section 6(c) of 
the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product liability.  That 
section provides:
A prescription drug or 
medical device is not reasonably safe due 
to defective design if the foreseeable risks 
of harm posed by the drug or medical 
device are sufficiently great in relation to 
is foreseeable therapeutic benefits that 
reasonable health-care providers, knowing 
of such foreseeable risks and therapeutic 
become the standard by which the questioned product is measured.@) (internal citation 
omitted).  
In all fairness, it must be said that the Potter court did not include liability for  
unknowable dangers within the scope of strict products liability,  ruling that manufacturers 
could only be liable for knowable dangers.  Potter, 694 A.2d at 1329.  The dangers in that 
case, however, were not unknowable.  Potter also indicated that there might be cases 
involving complex products in which consumer expectation would not be an appropriate test 
because Aan ordinary consumer might not be able to form expectations of safety.@ Potter, 
694 A.2d at 1333.
116 Potter v. Chicago Pheumatic Tool Co., 694 A.2d 1319, 1335 (Conn. 1997) (citations 
omitted).
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benefits, would not prescribe the drug or 
medical device for any class of patients.
This section completely eliminates appraisal of 
the consumer=s expectations from determination of 
whether a medical device is unreasonably dangerous.  
Thus, the section conflicts with Illinois law.
Moreover, the section provides manufacturers 
with virtual immunity from liability for all medical 
products.  Even when doctors discover unexpected 
injuries due to a medical device, they may find the device 
useful in some extreme cases. . . . Under section 6(c), the 
fact that the device remains useful for some patients 
would immunize the manufacturer from liability.
Commentators have noted that section 6(c) 
represents a substantial departure from established 
common law throughout the country. . . . Most courts that 
have considered related provisions of the Restatement 
(Third) have refused to adopt them.117
This quotation is highly significant in terms of the subject matter of 
this article.  The Third Restatement forced courts to take another look at 
where strict products liability had been and where it was going.  The 
necessity for this reexamination was generated by Third Restatement 
itself.118   Faced with the total exclusion of consumers from products 
liability law, courts rejected the Third Restatement and adhered to the law 
117 Mele v. Howmedica, Inc., 808 N.E.2d 1026, 1038-39 (Ill. App. 2004).
118 For other courts and opinions rejecting the Third Restatement and approving the 
consumer expectation, test, see  Jackson v. GMC, 60 S.W.3d 800, 802 (Tenn. 2001) (reaffirming 
that, under Tennessee law, the consumer expectation test A...is applicable to any products 
liability claim where the plaintiff intends to show that a manufacturer is liable for plaintiff's injuries as a 
result of an unreasonably dangerous product.@); Hiner v. Deere & Co., 340 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 
2003) (affirming that the Kansas courts will continue to use the consumer expectation test as laid out in 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in defective design claims.); Accord McCoy v. Whirlpool 
Corp., 2003 US Dist. LEXIS 11712 (D. Kan. 2003) (reiterating this point); Haddix v. Playtex Family 
Prods. Corp., 138 F.3d 681, 684 (7th Cir. 1998). In Haddix, the court cited with approval the holding in 
Papike v. Tambrands, Inc., 107 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 1997), and held that the risk of contracting Toxic Shock 
Syndrome was within an ordinary consumer=s knowledge and so, even though the jurisdiction allows for 
use of either the consumer expectation test or the risk-utility test, in defective design cases where you 
have Aa simple product which poses an obvious danger@ the risk-utility test is inapplicable and the 
consumer expectation test must be applied.); Murphy v. Playtex Family Prods. Corp., 176 F. Supp. 2d  
473, 487 (D. Md. 2001) (adopting the reasoning of the Seventh and Ninth circuits in Haddix and Papike.).
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they had developed under the Second.  Incidentally, this leads one to the 
corollary conclusion that the Third Restatement, as many of its critics 
have said, does not codify the law as it was when the Third Restatement 
was written, but rather represented an effort to change the law to what the 
Reporters thought it should be.  If it were truly a restatement, the courts 
who reaffirmed their commitment to preexisting consumer expectation 
standards would not have rejected it as inconsistent with the law in their 
jurisdictions.
C.  Reasonable Alternative Design
The Third Restatement defines design defect in terms of the 
availability of an alternative feasible design.  In other words, the plaintiff 
must prove the existence of reasonable alternative design in order to show 
that the product=s design was defective. 
Ironically, the trend toward incorporating a risk/utility test into a 
consumer expectation test with the goal of broader consumer protection 
in cases where the danger of the product was obvious metamorphosed 
into the Third Restatement abolition of the consumer expectation test 
with its goal of shrinking consumer protection.  ASubstitution of a risk-
utility analysis, however, especially as formulated in the Restatement 
Third, has attracted considerable criticism and has been viewed as a 
retrogression, as returning to negligence concepts and placing a very 
difficult burden on plaintiffs.@119  The Supreme Court of Kansas reacted 
119 Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 792 A.2d 1145, 1154-55 (Md. 2001).  The court 
further pointed out that, despite efforts by the Reporters of the Third Restatement to 
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with horror to the Third Restatement=s requirement of a reasonable 
alternative design: 
The Third Restatement's requirement that a plaintiff 
produce a reasonable alternative design has been harshly 
criticized. See Vargo, The Emperor's New Clothes: The 
American Law Institute Adorns a "New Cloth@ for Section 
402A Products Liability Design Defects--A Survey of the 
States Reveals a Different Weave, 26 U. Mem. L. Rev. 
493 (1996); Frank Vandall, State Judges Should Reject 
the Reasonable Alternative Design Standard of the 
Restatement (Third), Products Liability, Section 2(b), 8 
Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 62 (1998); Westerbeke, The 
Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 8 Kan. J.L. 
& Pub. Pol'y 66 (1998). Vandall states that the reasonable 
alternative design requirement is not supported by public 
policy or economic analysis because the cost of 
processing a case will make it economically impossible to 
produce a reasonable alternative design in a small 
products liability case. 8 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y at 63. 
Further, contrary to the view of the authors of the Third 
Restatement that the majority of states require a 
reasonable alternative design to establish a design defect, 
research by John F. Vargo indicates that very few states in 
fact have this requirement. See 26 U. MEM. L. REV. AT 
550-553. Vargo, in his exhaustive review, examines the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts' claim that "reasonable 
alternative design" is the majority rule in this country and 
concludes that, far from a majority rule, only three states 
require a reasonable alternative design and five do so by 
statute. See Appendix IV and related textual support for 
author's conclusions, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. AT 951, 501-
951.120
The goal of requiring a reasonable alternative design was clearly 
retrogressive.  Under this standard, manufacturers would never be liable 
unless the product could have been made safer.  In other words, there 
portray this as the majority view, it was unclear that most courts would agree with this 
position, and, Ato the extent that it is shared, it has been criticized as representing an 
unwanted ascendency of corporate interests under the guise of tort reform.@
120 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 945-46 (Kan 2000). 
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would be no such thing as a product that was unavoidably dangerous and 
defective.  Under the Third Restatement, manufacturers would only be 
liable for products with curable dangers, and never for products whose 
designs could not be changed to reduce or eliminate their hazards.  
This shift in focus to protecting manufacturers is all the more 
pernicious because strict products liability was developed to protect 
consumers.121   The focus should be on the injured consumer and the 
product that caused the injury, and not on the manufacturer=s conduct.  
Focus on the manufacturer=s conduct amply appears in negligence based 
doctrine, but strict products liability was supposed to be something else.  
Faced with the Third Restatement, however, courts have realized 
that products liability doctrine is at risk of losing the attributes that led to 
its development in the first place.  In few contexts is this clearer than in 
that in that of prescription drugs.  Section 6(c) of the Third Restatement 
pronounces that a  prescription pharmaceutical is only defective if no 
doctor would ever prescribe it to any Aclass of patients@  for any 
condition.  It is highly unlikely that any plaintiff could ever meet this 
burden of proof, as it is hard to imagine a drug that has passed through 
the FDA processes and is not useful to any patient whatsoever.  As one 
court pointed out:
121 See Andrew F. Popper, Traditional Restatement of Harbinger of Policy Changes?: 
Tort Reform Policy More Than State Law Dominates Section 2 of the Third Restatement, 8 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL=Y 38, 40 (1998)(AControversy happens when you deal with a product 
that is made by a company that is not negligent and the product ends up killing people, and 
there is no readily available alternative, or the cost of producing an available alternative is 
prohibitive.  In that area, the Restatement fails you, as judges, and, more importantly, fails 
the public.@)
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The Third Restatement was intended as >a complete 
overhaul= of the Second Restatement.  These changes have 
garnered substantial criticism.  In particular, ' 6(c) has 
been criticized for its failure to reflect existing case law, 
its lack of flexibility with regard to drugs involving 
differing benefits and risks, its unprecedented application 
of a reasonable physician standard, and the fact that a 
consumer=s claim could easily be defeated by expert 
opinion that the drug had some use for someone, despite 
potentially harmful effects on a large class of individuals.  
To date, no court has adopted the Third Restatement=s 
strict liability test for prescription drugs, and one court 
has explicitly refused to adopt the test.122
The Third Restatement thus brought into the codified open what
courts had been comfortable doing on a case by case basis.  Eliminating 
the consumer expectation test in favor of a risk utility test is one thing 
when its dilution is designed to further the goal of consumer protection, 
as was the case when it was changed to avoid precluding liability for 
open and obvious hazards.  It is quite another when the goal of its 
abolition is to protect manufacturers, a goal that becomes patently clear 
when the risk/utility test is coupled with the requirement of a reasonable 
alternative design.  The court in Vautour v. Body Masters Sports 
Industries pointed out that even adopting a risk/utility test did not 
automatically mean that the plaintiff had to prove a reasonable alternative 
design: AThe plaintiffs= burden was to present evidence regarding the risk-
utility factors; they did not have the duty of proving a safer, alternative 
design.@123  Risk/utility tests can exist in the absence of a reasonable 
122 Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 727 (Ga. App. 2003) 
123 Vautour v. Body Masters Sports Indus., 784 A.2d 1178, 1184 (N.H. 2001).
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alternative design requirement, and Athe rigid pre-requisite of a 
reasonable alternative design places too much emphasis on one of many 
possible factors that could potentially affect the risk-utility analysis.@124
Requiring a reasonable alternative design simply brought the goal of 
deterring lawsuits into the open.  The court in Vautour decided that Athe 
risk-utility test as currently applied protects the interests of both 
consumers and manufacturers in design defect cases, and we decline to 
adopt section 2(b) of the Third Restatement.@125
There has been considerable controversy surrounding 
the adoption of Restatement (Third) of Torts _ 2(b).  Most 
of the controversy stems from the concern that a 
reasonable alternative design requirement would impose 
an undue burden on plaintiffs . . . .Commentators have 
noted that for suits against manufacturers who produce 
highly complex products, the reasonable alternative 
design requirement will deter the complainant from filing 
suit because of the enormous costs involved in obtaining 
expert testimony.  Thus, because of the increased costs to 
plaintiffs of bringing actions based on defective product 
design, commentators fear that an alternative design 
requirement presents the possibility that substantial 
litigation expenses may effectively eliminate recourse, 
especially in cases in which the plaintiff has suffered little 
damage.126
The court in Sternhagen likewise refused to adopt the Third 
Restatement=s  requirement of a reasonable alternative design, 
comprehensively rejecting the Third Restatement on several grounds 
simultaneously:
124 Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184.
125 Id.
126 Vautour, 784 A.2d at 1184 (N.H. 2001).
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We decline to extend th[e requirement of a 
reasonable alternative design] to cases where alternative 
designs did not exist and a product=s dangers were 
undiscovered or undiscoverable at the time of 
manufacture.  If we were to do so, we would inject 
negligence concepts into Montana=s strict products 
liability law and eviscerate the public policy underlying 
strict products liability law in this State.127
 Injecting negligence concepts into strict products liability law was, 
of course, precisely the goal of the Third Restatement.  Indeed, as the 
courts point out, there is nothing left of strict products liability under the 
Third Restatement. 
IV.  Conclusion: The Biter Bit
The openness of the Third Restatement forced courts to confront 
both what they had done in eliminating protections for injured plaintiffs 
and what the Third Restatement was doing in the same respect.  It is this 
very openness and the resultant need to confront it that has caused 
courtsBmaybe even forced themBto return to strict products liability.  
Once the changes that had gradually been made to section 402A were 
brought out in to the open in the Third Restatement, courts recognized 
how far strict products liability had strayed from its origins and goals, 
and realized that the Third Restatement was at risk of abolishing it 
altogether.  For the same reasons that strict products liability was 
originally adopted, the courts are now in the process of reaffirming their 
127 Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1147 (Mont. 1997).
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commitment to retainingBor in some cases reinstatingBthe doctrine.128
Society generally has a history of tacit decision-making that, 
when opened up to inspection, causes consternation.  It is one thing to 
argue that automobiles should not have airbags, even though such an 
omission will kill a substantial number of faceless people.  It is another to 
argue that someone who sets out to row across the Atlantic should be left 
to his or her own devices when lost to radio contact.  In this latter 
situation, huge search and rescue operations are likely to be launched, 
with no expense spared, and with only one life at stake.129  It is my 
contention that the unfairness of this tacit process of curtailing liability 
became impossible to ignore when the Third Restatement attempted to 
codify it.  The Third Restatement did one of two things in every 
jurisdiction in which it was invoked.  The first of these was indeed to 
codify the law of a jurisdiction as it had developed over the years, with 
rejection of liability for unknowable dangers, elimination of the consumer 
expectation test, or requirement of a reasonable alternative design.  This 
forced courts to confront the fact that strict products liability had been 
incrementally eroded almost to the point where it had ceased to exist in 
their jurisdictions.  The second of these was to provide courts with a 
contrasting view of strict products liability to the view in place in their 
128 Delaney v. Deere & Co., 999 P.2d 930, 946 (Kan 2000).
129 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES IN LIBERTY AND JUSTICE: 
ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 2 (Brian Barry ed., 1991).  It is one thing to condemn a known 
person with a known face to certain death in the icy waters of the Atlantic, and a very 
different matter to cause the deaths by product of numerous faceless, future people whose 
identity is in no way predictable.
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jurisdictions.  This led courts to reexamine their prior law, developed 
under the Second Restatement, and at least in some cases to reaffirm their 
commitment to that prior law.   That this led to some of the opinions 
discussed in this article seems likely: the Third Restatement provided a 
mirror for examination of strict products liability law.  In many cases, the 
Third Restatement stood up poorly to the challenge of the Second, 
leading courts to take positions contrary to those expressed in the Third 
Restatement.  Those advocating abandoning strict products liability might 
have done better to leave it alone, allowing the incremental process to 
continue its work.
In short, the Third Restatement made explicit what courts had 
implicitly been doing in ruling that manufacturers would not be liable for 
failing to warn of unknowable dangers, for design defects in the absence 
of an alternative feasible design, or for products that failed consumer 
expectation tests.  In this very explicitness lay the seeds of a renewal for 
strict products liability.  Courts, more comfortable with exempting 
manufacturers from liability for products that failed a risk/utility test on a 
case by case basis, had to confront the blanket nature of manufacturer 
exemption from liability for injuries to consumers who (like the 
manufacturers) could not avoid injury but who (unlike the manufacturers) 
were not responsible for and did not profit from the availability of the 
product.  Faced with an uncompromising rule, courts, like the Sternhagen 
court, have come to recognize the fundamental unfairness of exempting 
manufacturers from paying for the injuries their products caused.  Strict 
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products liability has returned, and we ironically owe this return to the 
Third Restatement.
What the Third Restatement did was prove too much. The pro-
defendant trend, which the Third Restatement attempted to codify and 
encourage, had occurred, assuming that it existed, without courts being 
required closely to scrutinize what they were doing.  It happened 
gradually, and in small incremental steps that meant that courts could 
avoid confronting the plight into which consumers were being cast by 
their rulings.  But turning this incremental phenomenon into a rule, as the 
Third Restatement did, pushed the courts too far and to hard down the 
slippery slope.  It meant that the courts could no longer ignore what their 
own rulings had so subtly accomplished.  It has also caused the re-
examination of the ALI as an appropriate policy-making entity, leading to 
questions about whether the ALI is any more qualified to make policy 
than the courts.130
It is, of course, true that in the process of ruling in individual 
cases the courts were making bad law.  A prime example is the rule that 
manufacturers could not be liable for failing to warn of unknowable 
dangers.  The thoughtless breadth of these rulings is itself breathtaking.  
But the route to liablility through later distinctions between cases 
remained open.  In a distinction going the other way, Feldman at least 
130 See Marshall S. Shapo, Symposium on the American Law Institute: Process, 
Partisanship, and the Restatements of the Law: Products Liability: the Next Act, 26 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 761, 766 (1998)(Athe processes of the ALI may have no comparative advantage with 
political institutions in making choices among political arguments.@)
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pretended that it was not overruling Beshada, and Brown could pretend it 
was limited to prescription pharmaceuticals, leaving its extension to all 
products to the later decision in Anderson.  In a common law area, 
distinguishing earlier precedent to achieve a different result is itself an art 
form.  But when the rule is codified, such distinctions are no longer so 
easy to draw and one cannot as easily ignore or rationalize what one is 
doing. 
When the courts were faced with the Third Restatement, they 
were taken back in time to the days before strict products liability, when 
all agreed that consumers needed protection from dangerous and 
defective products, protection that negligence standards could not supply.  
The whole rationale behind strict products liability was that 
manufacturers should be liable, even in the absence of negligence, 
because it was appropriate that manufacturers compensate equally 
innocent plaintiffs for their injuries caused by defective products.  Instead 
of adopting the Third Restatement, many courts have returned to the idea 
that gave birth to strict products liability in the first place:, as between 
innocent plaintiffs and innocent manufacturers, the manufacturers should 
pay for the injuries caused by their defective products.  
The causal link between the Third Restatement and the renewal of 
strict products liability cannot be directly proven.  Rather, circumstantial 
evidence leads to the conclusion that the Third Restatement, far from 
promoting the retreat from strict products liability, has caused its revival.  
First, opinions like Sternhagen carefully analyze the Third Restatement, 
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making explicit exemptions that had earlier been implicit or disguised in 
opinions that rejected liability for unknowable dangers.  Giving the rule a 
face forced courts to confront the unfairness of what they had done in 
leaving certain costs on consumers.  Second, it is more than odd that the 
revival of strict products liability should occur in today=s world, where 
conservatism is rampant and corporations more powerful than ever.  The 
recessions of the 1980's allowed corporations to cry poverty and persuade 
courts to rule in their favor, cutting back on laws that would have led to 
liability.  The market failures of this decade should, at least in theory, 
produce the same results.  This is not happening. One is at a loss to 
explain this.  The factor that differentiates this era from the 1980's is the 
very presence of the Third Restatement itself.  Third, I cannot think of 
any other reason that would explain Sternhagen and its progeny other 
than the Third Restatement.  This leaves me with a res ipsa loquitur of 
causation argument: post hoc, ergo propter hoc, at least in the absence of 
a better explanation.
Faced with the Third Restatement, courts have realized that 
products liability doctrine is at risk of losing the attributes that led to its 
development in the first place.  The Third Restatement brought into the 
codified open what courts had been comfortable doing on a case by case 
basis.  It is this very openness that forced courts to confront what they 
had done in eliminating protections for injured plaintiffs, and it is this 
very openness that has caused courtsBmaybe even forced themBto return 
to strict products liability.  products liability has returned, and we owe 
67
this return to the Third Restatement. 
